Living Reality of the Syrian Refugees outside the Jordanian Refugee Camps "An attempt to reveal the incentives to stay and return"

Dr. Ali Jamil Al-Sarayrah¹, Dr. Khaldoon Al-Habashneh², Dr. Mousa Al-Khatib³

Abstract

The current study aims to identify the security, economic and social incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees living outside Jordanian asylum camps to stay in Jordan, and the incentives of return to homeland at the same time. The study adopted the descriptive method and designed a questionnaire as an instrument to collect data, where statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS) was used to collect data. The study sample reached (400) Syrian refugees paterfamilias included the both sexes selected by the intentional method. The study found that there was security, economic and social incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan, and security, economic and social incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to return provided that they change over time. The study showed no differences among the study sample due to the variable of family income towards security, economic and social incentives to stay or return. In light of the results, the study recommended to economically integrate the Syrian refugees in the Jordanian market through providing them with an international financial support that achieves benefit to both host communities and refugees.

Keywords: Jordan, Syrian refugees, Jordanian asylum camps.

Introduction

Conflict in Syria resulted in the biggest crisis in the world as more than (5,556,417) refugees fled from their homeland and more than (6.1) million displaced, some of them inside the country, distributed into 126 countries. The Syrian refugees form (8.25%) of the whole refugees in the world based on UNHCR until the date of 30 of January, 2020, as most of them are located in the Syrian neighboring countries with a

¹ Assistant professor, Al-Zaytooneh University of Jordan, Ali.sarairah@zuj.edu.jo

² Associate professor, Al-Zaytooneh University of Jordan, khaldoonh@hotmail.com

³ Assistant professor, Al-Zaytooneh University of Jordan, Mousa.alkhateeb@zju.edu.jo

percentage of (83%) distributed into Turkey (3.334.576) million refugees, Lebanon (915) thousand refugees and (1.300) million ones in Jordan, as (659000) thousands of them are registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2020).

The Syrian refugees' influx to Jordan has imposed great pressures on the country institutions, and exacerbated the economic and financial problems, in addition to the problems of the Infrastructure. The available limited economic opportunities resulted in a great competition among the refugees themselves and the host communities on unskilled work in the unofficial sector and reaching services, which made Jordan impose more restricted policies on the refugees over time; as Jordan policies have an extreme influence on the refugees freedom of movement, residence, work, housing, education and health care (Yahya, 2018) because the international community's abandonment of Jordan in facing the burdens of the Syrian asylum, where the Jordan response plan to the Syrian crisis allocated to support the Syrian refugees in Jordan of 2020 witnessed a decline in the international fund; the value of the plan reached (2.24) billion dollar, as (781) million dollar of it was funded with a percentage of (34%). The size of deficit in the plan recorded (1.46) billion dollar with a percentage of (65%) (Jordanian Ministry of Planning, 2021).

The lack of fund increased challenges facing the Syrian refugees and ways of their lives in Jordan, while some Syrian refugees may choose to return to their country, Syria, under these situations, the circumstances in Syria are far from being proper for returning of refugees; the security conditions are still unstable, and a collective return to the refugees at this time will exacerbate loss of security because of the intense competition for the resources and limited infrastructure, as the World Bank estimated the accumulated losses in the Syrian Gross domestic Product (GDP) between 2011 and 2018 which reached \$226 billion, four times the Syrian (GDP) in 2010. International Monetary Fund estimated the cost of reconstruction in Syria at between \$100 and \$200 billion, where in the ten largest cities in Syria, more than a quarter of the available houses in 2010 was destroyed partially or completely by 2010 especially in cities that have been out of control of the regime for a while (World Bank, 2015). In addition, based on the UN estimates, 90% of Syrians inside Syria live below the poverty line, while 80% of them suffer from food insecurity since 2021 (Yahya, 2018:15).

This realty in Syria raised in Jordan a question about the possibility of refugees return to their houses in a case their situations stabilize, or they choose to settle in Jordan, as Jordanian politicians confirm that it is expected that "a third of the Syrians will return only to Syria if the security situations stabilize for several considerations, the most prominent of them is the environment of post-war needs many years

to settle politically, security and economic, which makes every Syrian distance himself from dangers" (Abu Tair, 2017), although the security situations from within Syria indicates that the changes that have occurred recently as a result of the state's control over more than a half of the area of Syria with a percentage of (63.38%) of Syrian geography resulted from the Russian — Iranian support and interference which changed large areas to secure, safe and quiet ones, and prepared suitable circumstances to the Syrian refugees return to their home (Barakat & Al-Kahlout, 2021: p13).

So, the collective return of the Syrian refugees issue in light of the current situations in Syria remains excluded and vague, and at the same time the circumstances of the refugees living in the host countries contributed to shaping attitudes towards return or stay. Hence, this study came which aims to reveal the security, economic and social incentives of stay or return of the Syrian refugees living outside the Jordanian asylum camps, as the problem of this study is based around three main themes that are considered as incentives to stay in the host country (Jordan) and incentives to return to mother country (Syria) at the same time which are: first, Security incentives to stay lie in (Security in Jordan, legal legislations related to the refugees rights and protection, while security incentives to return - provided they change in time-includes the absence of security and safety, fear of arrests, and compulsory military conscription), second, the economic incentives to stay in the host country represent in (granting work permits to Syrian refugees, job opportunities, ability to manage their living affairs, access to food and cash assistance, while the economic incentives to return to Syria- provided they change in timerepresent in the availability of basic services, job opportunities, meeting basic needs, raising the value of the currency and suitable wages), third, social incentives to stay (presence of mutual relationships with the host community, kinship relationships and lineage relationships, while social incentives to return to Syria represent in desire for family reunification, the presence of relatives, and the restoration of communication relations between family members and relatives. The study attempts to reveal the differences among the study sample members according to the variables of the study towards the security, economic and social incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees in Jordan to stay or return the mother country.

Based on the above, the study problem is determined by answering the following questions:

1. What are the most prominent security incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan and the incentives to return to the mother country?

- 2. What are the most prominent economic incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan and the incentives to return to the mother country?
- 3. What are the most prominent social incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan and the incentives to return to the mother country?
- 4. Are there any differences among the study sample according to the variables of the study towards the security, economic and social incentives for the refugees to stay and return?

Study importance and justification

The study gains its importance from its results about the desire of (65%) of the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan, compared to 30% of those who do not wish to return especially since not changing the situations in Syria will satisfy the majority of the refugees who refuse to return to stay in Jordan, which imposes great challenges on the economy and infrastructure, especially since the studies conducted in this regard reached a great negative influence and pressure that the Syrian refugees are putting pressure on the sectors of labor, health, education and services. Hence, the study gains its importance in two tracks, the first scientific track is represented in adding knowledge in specialty and research interests related to the refugees affairs, and the applied track, as the current study serve the social policy of Jordan and everything related to the living reality of Jordan citizens. In addition, the study provides the official institutions, unofficial organizations and international institutions interested in the refugees' affairs and decision makers with the required context information to take suitable decisions about the refugees' issue of stay and return.

Procedural concepts of study

- 1. Incentives of return: factors that motivate the Syrian refugees to move from the host community to the mother country without any presence of urgent plans to depart again.
- 2. Incentives to stay: factors that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in the host community without any emergent plans to return to the mother country.
- 3. Security incentives: they are incentives related to security (physical safety, arresting, torture) which motivate the Syrian refugee to return to his home or stay in the asylum country.
- 4. Economic incentives: the incentives related to (job opportunities, meeting the basic needs, wages, lining management) which motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in the asylum country or return to his original home.

5. Social incentives: they are incentives related to social interactions, family reunion and communication that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in the asylum country or return to his original home.

The living reality of the Syrian refugees in Jordanian host communities The number of Syrian s in Jordan is about (1.300.000), as the number of those who entered Jordanian lands before the Syrian crisis to start was about (750) thousand based on lineage, intermarriage and trade (Al-Horani, 2016: 146). After the crisis worsened, (659) Syrian refugees entered Jordan based on international reports who were registered with the UNHCR, where (81%) of the refugees live in the host communities (UNHCR and UN Development Program, 2015). It should be noted that based on statistics issued by Department of Refugee Affairs, (19%) of the Syrian refugees reside inside the camps and all of them are in the northern governorates that bear the biggest burden because of hosting the refugees since they are closed to the Syrian borders (Za'rour, 2014). The majority of the refugees' lives outside the camps in Jordan is characterized with increased weakness related to the financial and food security and legal status, as most of them live under the poverty line which is (68) Jordanian dinar per month (about 2.25 American dollar per day), where (10%) of them live in extreme poverty, four fifths of (80%) of individuals resort to the strategies of adaptation in emergency situations and the majority of them suffer from high or low lack of the basic needs. Families which are headed by females form (40%) of the Syrian refugees families in Jordan which are considered one of the groups most vulnerable to food insecurity and depend on the assistance program (Absos, 2018:7).

The issue of providing a suitable shelter forms one of the major matter to the Syrian refugees living outside camps, as (75%) of the Syrian refugees suffer from great difficulties in finding shelters (Al-Hourani, 2016:147), and because the lack of work and depletion of savings that were in the possession of the Syrian refugees, "a third of the Syrian refugees in Jordan became indebted to the owners of the houses where they live in according to the report by Right Watch (Right Watch, 2016: 3).

The cost of health care formed a problem to the Syrian refugees, as Right Watch confirms that the Syrian refugees face difficulties in getting a suitable health care, and sometimes they are unable to offer the cost of the care they need (Yahya, 2018). Regarding the educational status of the children of Syrian refugee families in Jordan, about (62%), or more than 330,000 Syrian refugee children registered in Jordan, continue education in official public schools (Planning and International Cooperation,2017), but school dropout rates are high. In 2017, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimated that (68%) of school dropouts had previously been enrolled in school, as these high rates of absence dropout from school are due to obstacles,

some of them are expensive costs of education, bullying, school violence, long distance to school and the need to do housework (Reach Initiative, 2015).

As Syrian refugee children grow older, their school attendance tends to decline, because they partially consider that there is no benefit to education at a time when they are in need to support their families economically (Yahya et al., 2018). A study by International Labor Organization found that a quarter of the Syrian families depend in their income earning on children in order to pay the rents of their homes, pay the bills, and provide the basic needs of the family (Stave & Hillesund, 2015: 107).

The living conditions of the Syrian refugees were influenced by Corona epidemic, as several of them who live outside the camps lost their source of livelihood because of the sudden cut off their income coming in a form of daily payment before Cofid-19 (Veris et al., 2020:14), as the effect on Syrians in urban areas can be summarized as a severe loss of livelihood, violations regarding labor rights, loss of education and the threat of eviction (because of the inability to pay rent and bills), where for Syrian refugees this crisis has become inside a crisis (Sewell, 2020).

There is no doubt that the traditional policies that Jordan has imposed on in 2014 were the linked to the cut off or unexpected decline in the humanitarian aid because of the failure of the international community and its abandonment of Jordan in facing the crisis of the Syrian asylum that exhausted it, as the cut off the humanitarian aid resulted in return of thousands of Syrians from Jordan to Syria from 2014-2015 based on an official "voluntary" process with the great increase of the influx to a few hundred per day in August/September 2015, after the Syrians in the refugee-hosting areas were informed that the food aid provided to them would be cut off or reduced, where the International Organization for Migration estimated the number of returnees to their country, Syria, at (50) thousand that year (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2015). A report by World Food Program also confirmed that returning was reduces among the Refugees camps while aids were not reduced, but they were increased at (17%) among the resident refugees in Jordanian host communities (Numan, 2015).

Study background: Syrian refugees in Jordan between stay or return

It must be noted first that when researchers talk about incentives for stay and return, the starting point for stay is the arena and the Jordanian lived reality, including the security, economic and social dimensions, and the starting point for the act of return is the arena and the lived Syrian reality (provided that it changes over time) including the security, economic and social dimension, which means that the starting points for each of them are different.

Incentives of stay of the Syrian refugees in Jordan

First: Security incentives

- 1. Security in Jordan: Jordan is the regional "safety valve" of the displaced in the Middle East, where the nature of security and stability that Jordan has made it a destination for everyone in need, so we find that the dangerous threats facing Syrians in Jordan are little and spaced in time from each other, as most of Syrians believe that they live safety in Jordan and they think that the security situation in Jordan is all right, and in general they are able to accept inclusion in the Jordanian government protection and the host communities. A study conducted in 2014 showed that about (80%) of the refugees inside the camps felt safe, while the rate of feeling safe increased to (87%) related to the refugees who live outside the camps, and (50%) of the resident refugees outside the camps mentioned that they would seek police assistance if they encountered a security problem (Connable, 2015: 3), and this rate is considered too high considering the size of the gap among the majority of the refugees and the government security services throughout their lives in Syria, and this represents an incentive for their stay in Jordan.
- 2. Jordan commitment to refugee protection policies, legislation and treaties: Jordan position is considered to be progressive on refugees compared to other positions in the region countries in particular, and it keeps international standards regarding their treatment although it is not a part in of 1951 Convention nor the Amended Protocol of 1976, but it is bound by the rule of customary international law morally and humanely, as Jordan has undertaken a number of commitments towards refugees, some of them are:

A- Jordan's commitment not to forcibly return refugees to any place where their lives or freedom are threatened (Farhan & Mashaqbeh: 2019: 69), and based on the memorandum of understanding that Jordan signed in 1998 with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which confirmed a legal commitment on Jordan to respect the principle of no forced return (Francis, 2015:12-13).

B- Treatment of the refugees in Jordan in a way which is no less than that presented to its citizens in terms of religious rites, religious education to their sons and the country's commitment not to discriminate between refugees in terms of race, religion or origin, in a manner that does not contradict the provisions of the Jordanian constitution.

Second: Economic incentives to stay. There are several economic incentives playing a role in making the Syrian refugees stay in Jordan, some of them are:

1. Giving Syrian refugees work permits. Jordanian Ministry of Labor issued (283) thousand work permits to the Syrian refugees to work in

the local market from 2017 until the end of 2021 which is considered a record number with a symbolic fee reached (10 Jordanian Dinar- 14 Dollars). Among these permits (31) thousand one called "flexibility work permits" which allows the worker to move among similar works in the same sector and employers throughout the governorates. This merit is not permitted to foreign workers of other nationalities, and based on these permits, the Syrian refugees are able to work in professions allocated to foreign workers and within certain conditions in order to make balance between the high rates of unemployment among Jordanians and develop the living reality of the refugees (Ministry of Labor, 2021).

There is no doubt that that the Syrian refugees obtaining work permits with symbolic fees contributes in developing their living conditions, as the work permits provide them with a social and legal protection in the work environment, give them labor, health and medical rights in the event that they are exposed to work injuries, in addition to having their financial and labor rights in Social Security Corporation. And, in a precedent, Jordan allowed Syrian refugees who hold medical and health qualifications to provide health care services to Corona patients, although it is considered one of the closed professions to refugees (Jordanian Ministry of Labor, 2021), and according to a study conducted by the International Labor Organization, about (51%) of Syrian men who live outside the camps joined the Jordanian labor market, and (7%) of Syrian women participated in the Jordanian labor market (International Labor Organization, 2015).

- 2. There are job opportunities in several sectors for the Syrian refugees, although they are limited in sectors that allowed for the Syrian refugees in Jordan such as construction, agriculture, public cleaning services, factories and shops and restaurants. The Syrian refugees are able to work in sectors required professional skills such as handicrafts and textiles. These sectors are characterized by their low wages and long working hours, as Syrians do not look at wages for sufficiency and luxury as much as they look for subsistence, and despite all the previous negatives, job opportunities remain available for Syrian refugees, especially Jordanian employers have positive impressions about the skilled Syrian labor, so job opportunities remain available for the Syrian refugees in abundance, "this is confirmed by the results of the survey and a wide spread agreement between both Jordanians and Syrians that Syrian workers are ready to accept jobs and wages that Jordanians would not have accepted (Eric & Hilson, 2015: 11).
- 3. Obtaining food and cash aid which include the refugees families classified as the most in need of food assistance from outside the camps, whose food assistance has been reduced to 15 dinars per person monthly, where it will return to 23 dinars as it was before, in

addition to refugee families classified as "medium in need of food assistance" from outside the camps, and the UNHCR revealed that it considers that refugees who are below the poverty line are able to get for cash assistance, provided that files that they have a valid asylum document, a home visit during the last two years, and an active phone number (UNHCR, 2023).

Third: Social incentives to stay. There are a group of incentives that help the refugees to stay in Jordan, some of them are:

- 1. There is a mutual relationship between the host community and the Syrian refugees. A study conducted by Al-Malahi (2018) confirmed that there is a high degree of acceptance in the social dimension such as neighborhood, fellowship relations, participating in social accusations and marriage (Al-Malahi, 2018: 5). Al-Hourani throughout talking about the burden of the Syrian asylum-also confirmed that the Syrian refugees are establishing their private business, projects, social relations and societies now, which indicates that they would not turn back to Syria even stability exists there, since their entry to Jordan was not conditional on their return (Al-Hourani, 2017: 303).
- 2. There are kinship relationships between Syrian refugees and Jordanians, which are considered incentives to stay in Jordan, as a survey about the Syrian refugees and Jordanian citizens in (2017) consisted of (1013) Jordanian respondents and (100) Syrians revealed that (42%) of Syrians reported that they have Jordanian relatives in Jordan, and about (64%) of those who have relatives reported that they live in neighborhoods close to their relatives, and this a clear indicator that the Syrian community in Jordan is a family one rather than an individual one with no relatives (Shtaiwi, 2017).
- 3. There is a presence of intermarriage/family relations between Jordanians and Syrians. Based on a study conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan in 2017, a quarter of the sample of Syrian respondents have intermarriage or kinship relations with Jordanians, as (10%) reported that this intermarriage occurred after the Syrian crisis, whereas (90%) reported that this intermarriage took place before the crisis (Shtaiwi, 2017: 6). A statistic issued by the Jordanian Chief Justice Department of 2020 showed that (803) Jordanians got married to Syrian women, and the report also showed cases of marriage of Jordanian women to Syrians reached (382) incidents during 2020.

Incentive return to Syria

They are incentives started from the Syrian living reality (they represent a limit to non-return to Syria when they continue and depends on the time condition for its change - security, as economic and social changes in Syria are an important factor in attracting refugees to think about returning, some of them are:

First: Security incentives.

The lack of security and safety in Syria is a major factor in discouragement of people from return. The precondition of return is safety and security "the majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan are hesitant to return now because they are not sure about what is waiting for them on the other side of the borders" (Edwards and Al-Horani,2019), where achieving security and ensure the physical safety for the Syrian refugees motivate the Syrians to return.

Arrest, torture and enforced disappearance

Arrest, torture and enforced disappearance are important factors that discourage return, and based on information that Human Rights Watch has obtained during interviews with Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, the Syrian government subjected a number of returnees to Syria to arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, inhumane treatment, kidnapping and extrajudicial killing after their return to Syria, (Human Rights Council, 2016). Based on a reports prepared by the Syrian Network for Human Rights, in the period between March 2011 and August 2021 "No less than (102,287) people, including (2,405) children and (5,801) women, were disappeared. According to the report, the Syrian regime is responsible for (84.8%) of the total cases of enforced disappearance that occurred during that period. Based on the report, all parts of the conflict and the control forces practiced large-scale arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance of Syrian citizens due to the background of the armed conflict (Syrian Network for Human Rights, 2021), and this would discourage those who wish to return to their country, fearing that they would meet the same fate.

Mandatory of military conscription

Escaping from military conscription is one of the major reasons behind pushing men in the age of conscription to escape from Syria, and it is a main cause of being unable to return, so it represents an incentive to return when military conscription becomes voluntary. Arman & Lutfi (2019) in an article entitles "Return to Syria after escaping from military conscription" belongs to them confirm that although Syria sporadically declared that an amnesty for escapers from military conscription to encourage return, returnees found themselves again back on the draft lists in less than a week after the government exploited a loophole in the decree that rendered the amnesty provisions meaningless (Arman & lutfi, 2019).

Second: Economic incentives to return

There are economic incentives in Syria that depend on the time condition to change them including:

Lack of economic security, the most prominent indicators of the living reality in Syria are:

- 1. The deteriorating living conditions inside Syria. More than half of Syria live in a state of poverty, as (7.9) million people entered the circle of poverty and (4.4) million of them entered the extreme circle of poverty. The level of unemployment reached (486%), where more than (2.33) million people lost their employments which exposed the living condition of about (10) million people to danger, where those working people were supporting them. The level of unemployment increased sharply to reach (54.3%), which means that (3.39) million people are without work, and this resulted in losing the resource of income of (11.03) million (Syrian Center of Policies Studies, 2014, p6).
- 2. The family is unable to meet its basic needs in Syria. Reports issued by World Food Program belongs to the UN of 2023 that (70%) of Syrians inside their country are unable to provide food to their families. Based on the report, Syria recorded the sixth highest number in the world regarding the lack of food security, and it indicates that the state may lead to a new wave of displacement (World Food Program, 2023). According to a study entitled "the living conditions of the displaces families in light of the Syrian crisis", it revealed that the size of consumption of a family declines related to food commodity, meat, fruit and sweets, and decline of the number of the meals from three to two daily, and the Syrian family need to medical aid increased inside Syria, which could not pay the cost of treatment of the family members (Mustafa, 2016: 145).

There is no doubt that the sharp decline of the Syrian currency from about (500) Syrian lira to (4) thousand lira (Mustafa et al., 2020: 29), and with the high rates of inflation and sharp prices, this contributed to the deterioration of living conditions in Syria, and based on the United Nations World Food Program, the cost of basic foodstuffs increased with a percentage of (274%) in the year (2020), and the data of the World Food Program issued in 2021 indicate that a high record high reached (12.4) million Syrians - nearly (60%) of the population under the threat of minimal food security, and that in just over one year, (4.5) million additional Syrians suffer from food insecure" (Report: We are Syria, 2021:48).

3. Destroying of the Syrian infrastructure. War in Syria resulted in destroying the infrastructure and services in all parts of Syria, and left damage of transportation methods, water and electricity networks, and reached the minimum level of services for the Syrian citizen. All of the above falls under the name "Ways of Living/Life." A study entitled with "The security scene in Syria and its influence on the decision to return refugees" showed that (64%) of the study sample believe that the availability of public services such as transportation, water, electricity, health and education are important factors in the decision to return (Al-Abdullah, 2020:55).

Third: Social incentives to return

There are several incentives that contribute in returning of the refugees from Jordanian host communities to their mother home including:

• The desire of the family reunification. The family forms the backbone of Syrian society, and it has been greatly influenced by the conflict and repression, as most of its members have been dispersed due to displacement, arrest, or killing. Therefore, family reunification plays an important role as a condition for return (Report: We Are Syria, 2021:50). Some Syrian refugees choose to return, since their families are there and they visit them. According to a study entitled "Between the Hammer and the Anvil," the motives and experiences of the Syrians forced to return, it concluded in one of its results that (12%) of the total number of returning refugees did not have the opportunity to reunite their families in the countries of asylum, with an increase the duration of the complexity of the necessary procedures (Syrian League for Citizen Dignity, 2021:12).

There is no doubt that the Syrian family inside Syria faced huge changes occurred as a result of the crisis that Syria exposed to which led to extensive economic pressures on it, and changing and turning in attitudes. It also played an important role in reducing the level of relationships among the family members and resulted in emerging several states of family disintegration and rupture because of killing, displacement, kidnapping and body trading ...etc., low level of symbiotic and cooperative social relations, stark growing of "superego" at the expense of the social "we", until several relationships among members reached the point of estrangement as well as among families, whether as a result of migration and displacement, or by joining members of the same family to armed groups with multiple affiliations and common goal (Juma, 2017:13).

• Connectedness relationships. Connectedness relationships is subject to very subjective perceptions, as the range of multiple visits, telephone calls and use of internet are indicators of connectedness or lack thereof within the family network, and this expresses the strength of relations among the family members, and so it affects the decision of return or move abroad (Sari, 2008, p63). A study entitled "Future trends for Syrians in Gaziantep, Turkey (2017) revealed a strong link between the degree of connectedness and thinking of return, and based on the study results, (78%) of the sample who follow the news of their area often think of returning to Syria (Jalabi, 2017:274).

Literature review

Among the local studies that meet with the subject of this study is the study by Al-Omari (2021) entitled "Factors affected the decision of return of the Syrian refugees in Jordan", as the study sample consisted

of (357) individuals. The study concluded that the security factors affected the decision of the refugees return were their feeling of lack of security in their country, and fear of being killed or being asked for military service. The results showed that the refugees receiving international aid and assistance compared to the low living conditions in Syria has a great influence on the decision of return.

A survey by Nama Center for Studies (2018) entitled "Would the Syrian refugees return to their country" revealed that about (50%) of the Syrian refugees would not return to their country, and based on the results, the lack of security and stability in their country represents the biggest obstacle against their return. The results also showed that (67%) of the Syrian refugees feel welcome to a high degree in Jordan, as for the security situation, (12.3%) of them fear of the conscription, and (7%) confirmed that the living conditions in Syria are too bad which made it difficult to think of return.

A study about social and economic limits of the Syrian refugees return conducted by Mustafa et al., (2021) concluded that the development of the economic situation is considered a motivation to think about return, and according to the study, the lack infrastructure, basic services (electricity, water, gas ...etc.) and lowness of the living level were reflected on the refugees' decisions and options to remain outside Syria.

A study by Yahya (2018) found that the Syrian refugees have no desire to return unless there would be a political transfer that ensure their safety and security. The fourth regional survey by the High Commissioner for Refugees (2018) about the perceptions of Syrian refugees and their desire to return to Syria reveals that (85%) of Syrians have no desire to return to their homeland because of fears about security and safety in their country, and the survey indicated that three quarters of Syrian refugees have hopes and aspirations to return to their country, Syria, one day, and this confirms their continued connection to their country, homes and families.

A study conducted by Al-Rababah (2022) revealed that circumstances in any refugee's home form the major motives of desire to return, and safety and security in the original country mainly affect the refugees' decisions, in addition to the economic abilities, services availability and personal connections. On the contrary, conditions in the refugee host country play a much smaller role in this. The study showed that the refugees would not turn to their home unless the conditions developed dramatically.

A study by Al-Suleman (2018) entitled "The Syrian refugees' intention in the UK of return" concluded that the decision of return is complex and has a great deal of uncertainty, and according to the study, the majority intend to return but it is linked to several security and

economic fears. A study conducted by Achilli (2016) entitled "Return to Syria" concluded that the reduce of international organizations to aids pushed the refugees to look for better living conditions in other countries.

Study methodology

The study adopted the social survey method, and the design style was descriptive.

Study population

The study population consisted of all Syrian refugees living outside Jordanian asylum camps in the governorates of Amman, Irbid, Mafraq and Jerash, where the greatest overcrowded of the Syrian refugees exists that reached (532.289) (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020).

Study sample

The study sample consisted of (400) of heads of Syrian refugee families of both gender residing outside the refugee camps. It should be noted that the researchers could not obtain a frame for the sample, which throughout it a random sample can be drawn, where the Syrian refugees live in separate and unorganized areas which are not subject to organization, and there are no lists of their names. The study sample reached (Amman-189, Irbid-88, Mafraq -77, Jerash -46), as the sample was drawn by the intentional way where the questionnaire targeted the decision makers inside the family, since return or stay is a decision as Lee confirmed, and the sample was taken by asking about their resident places, as some of them responded to fill the questionnaire and others refused. The majority of them had an educational level less than secondary - and this required the researchers to present and read the questions in a simple way to the respondents, and the questionnaires were filled out in the presence of the researchers which took six semi-intermittent months.

Study instrument design

The study adopted in collecting data the questionnaire consisted of three pivots; the first pivot consisted of the characteristics of the study sample (gender, age, educational level, number of family members, years of resident in Jordan, coming from Syria to Jordan, marital status, work, whole income of a family, with whom you live in Jordan, living condition in Syria, living condition in Jordan, desire to turn to Syria and desire to stay in Jordan). The second pivot included the incentives of return and consisted of the security incentives which were (5) questions, economic incentives consisted of (5) questions and social incentives consisted of (5) questions. It has developed as many indicators as possible that can measure the motivators of return and survival, and previous literature has been used in designing the questionnaire, including Al-Omari study (2021), Mustafa et al. study

(2021), Al-Rababah study (2022) and surveys of Nama Center for studies (2018).

Instrument validity

The arbitrators' agreement method was adopted to measure virtual validity, as the instrument was presented to a group of specialists, and in light of their observations some items were added, some were deleted and some were amended and reformulated.

Instrument reliability

To test the instrument reliability, Cronbach's Alpha Coefficients were found as shown in table (1), and all of them were validity for the goals of analysis.

Table (1) Cronbach's Alpha Coefficients to measure the study instrument reliability

| Cronbach's Alpha | Security indicators motivating you to stay in |
|------------------|--|
| Coefficients | Jordan |
| 0.81 | Economic indicators motivating you to stay in |
| | Jordan |
| 0.80 | Social indicators motivating you to stay in Jordan |
| 0.88 | Incentives to stay in Jordan |
| 0.88 | Security indicators motivating you to return to |
| | your home Syria |
| 0.85 | Economic indicators motivating you to return to |
| | your home Syria |
| 0.83 | Social indicators motivating you to return to your |
| | home Syria |
| 0.80 | Incentives to return to Syria |
| 0.89 | Security indicators motivating you to stay in |
| | Jordan |

Used statistics methods

To analyze the study data and answer the questions, the following Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used:

Descriptive statistics:

Frequencies and percentages: to measure distributions of the sample individuals' characteristics

Mean: to measure average of the sample members' answers as Fivepoint Likert scale was used to answer questions of the study questionnaire, the following table explains this:

| = | | _ | = | | |
|--------------------|----------------|------------|---------|----------|-------------------|
| Degree | Strongly agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly disagree |
| Agreement | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Relative weight | 81-100% | 61- 80% | 41-60% | 21-40% | 1-20% |

| Upper limit- | | 1-5 | |
|--------------|---|-----|--|
| Lower limit | _ | 1-3 | |
| Number of | = | 2 | |
| levels | | 3 | |

The number of levels will be as follows:

| Level | Period |
|-------------|-----------|
| 1 –2.33 | 1-2.33 |
| 2.34 – 3.67 | 2.34-3.67 |
| 3.68 – 5 | 3.68-5 |

Standard deviation: to measure the dispersion of the sample members' answers from their mean

Inferential statistics:

(Independent Sample T-test)

(One Way ANOVA)

(Cronbach Alpha)

Table (2) Sample distribution according to their personal variables

| Percent | Frequency | | |
|---------|-----------|---------------|------------------|
| 86.5 | 346 | Male | |
| 13.5 | 54 | Female | Type of gender |
| 94.3 | 377 | Less than | |
| 3.3 | 13 | second | Educational |
| | | secondary | level |
| | | | |
| 2.5 | 10 | BA | |
| 16.3 | 65 | Less than 36 | |
| 41.8 | 167 | 36-45 | Age |
| 42.0 | 168 | More than 45 | |
| 12.8 | 51 | 4 or less | |
| 68.5 | 274 | 5-8 members | Number of |
| 18.8 | 75 | 9 or more | family members |
| 10 | 4 | 1-3 | Number of years |
| 20 | 8 | 4-7 | of your resident |
| 97.0 | 388 | 8 or more | in Jordan |
| 4.8 | 19 | No | Did you come |
| 95.3 | 381 | Yes | from Syria to |
| | | | Jordan directly |
| 2.3 | 9 | Single | Marital status |
| 88.3 | 353 | Married | |
| 2.0 | 8 | Divorced | |
| 7.5 | 30 | Widower | |
| 8.5 | 34 | With a permit | |
| 24.5 | 98 | Without a | Job |
| | | permit | |

| 67.0 | 268 | I don't work | |
|-------|-----|-----------------|-------------------|
| 90.8 | 363 | Less than 300 | Family total |
| 9.3 | 37 | 300-600 | income in JD |
| 76.8 | 307 | With all my | |
| | | family members | |
| 17.3 | 69 | With some | With whom do |
| | | members of my | you live in |
| | | family | Jordan now |
| 2.0 | 8 | With my friends | |
| 3.8 | 15 | Alone | |
| 0.3 | 1 | Excellent | |
| 0.3 | 1 | Good | How do you |
| 0.3 | 1 | Acceptable | describe the |
| 3.8 | 15 | Bad | living condition |
| 95.5 | 382 | Unbearable | in Syria now |
| 0.5 | 2 | Excellent | How do you |
| 4.5 | 18 | Good | describe the |
| 8.3 | 33 | Acceptable | living condition |
| 16.8 | 67 | Bad | in Jordan now |
| 70.0 | 280 | Unbearable | |
| 2.3 | 9 | I'd like | |
| 95.0 | 380 | I don't like | Would you like |
| 2.8 | 11 | I have not | to return to |
| | | decided yet | Syria |
| 65.0 | 260 | I'd like | Would you like |
| 0.8 | 3 | I don't like | to stay in Jordan |
| 100.0 | 400 | Total | |

It is clear from table (2) that most of the sample members are males with a percentage of (86.5%) within the age group (36-45 years), which is economically active class, as most of them of low education and their percentage is (94.3%), which indicates that they work in low jobs with low wages. The data also shows that the largest percentage of the respondents are married with a percentage of (88.3%), which means that the Syrian refugees have come with their families, which imposes great burdens and responsibilities on them, especially as for the issue of stay, return or resettlement. The data also shows that the largest percentage does not work with a percentage of (67.0%), where this is a natural result, as Jordan is considered one of the poor countries and suffers from huge indebtedness. So, Jordan is unable to provide job opportunities even for Jordanians, as poverty and unemployment rates were high even before the Syrian asylum, which raised the economic burdens on Jordan.

Data also show that the majority is poor living under the line of poverty where their family income is less than 300 Jordanian dinar (90.8%) which exposes them to great suffering because of the high costs of

living in Jordan. Data also shows that (95.0%) of them are who don't like to return to their home Syria, as the study sample think that the conditions of return haven't been achieved especially the lack of security and basic needs of life, and (65.0%) have the intention to stay in Jordan since they came to Jordan seeking security for them and their families.

Data indicated that (70%) of the respondents think that the living condition in Jordan now is unbearable because of lack of work, the high cost of living and debts, and (95.5%) think that the living condition in Syria now is unbearable as the sample think life in Syria is full of extreme dangers because of lack of security, militarization of society, spread the culture of revenge, hunger, spread of killing, kidnapping and control of militias on land.

Data also show that (76.8%) of the respondents live with all family members, and this rate indicates that Syrian families tried to reunite in Jordan, and (95.3%) of the respondents came from Syria to Jordan directly, and this can be interpreted by the geographical proximity and their awareness of the security that Jordan enjoys, similarities in habits and customs between the two societies, whereas data show that (19%) came to Jordan from other countries, as the majority of them came from Lebanon and Egypt, and the Syrian refugees who came from Egypt confirm that the motive for that is family reunion, but as for those who came from Lebanon to Jordan, the motive was the discriminative practices and distinguish in treatment that led them to escape from Lebanon and come to Jordan. The Syrian refugees whether they were from Egypt or Lebanon confirmed that the similarity in habits and customs between the Syrian and Jordanian societies was the motive to choose Jordan to stay and remain in it.

The data also shows that the largest percentage of them had the number of years of residence in Jordan transcended 8 years at a rate of (97%), which means that they probably came at the beginning of the events in their country, and because of the long period of their stability, which indicates their desire to stay in Jordan. The length of the period also contributes to make their integration into their host communities easy, and the data shows that (68.5%) of their family members are more than 8 people, as the Syrian family is large in the number of its members, which means that most of them are from the Syrian rural communities.

The answers of the study questions

The answer of the first question: What are the most prominent security incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan, and incentives to return to their mother homeland?

First: The security incentives motivating the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan

Data in the following table shows that security incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan got high scores ranged between (4.13-4.92), as the Syrians refugees feel safe and secure in Jordan which formed a great motivator to stay in Jordan; the Syrian refugees seek for physical safety for themselves and family members which has been lost in their country. This result agrees with some results of the study by Al -Rababah, 2022), where what mainly affect the refugees' decisions are security and safety, as data in table (3) indicate that they were not exposed to any violence by Jordanian security services, and this makes them feel they live in a country ruled by institutions a laws which encourages them to stay in it especially when comparing between what they have faced in their country and what they actually witness in the host country, Jordan.

In addition, data indicates that they enjoy freedom of opinion and movement inside Jordan without any obstacles, which is an incentive to stay; as the researchers observed that the Syrian refugees feel very comfortable in Jordan especially they have experienced living in Jordan for years and they talk about roaming at day and night without fear or accountability.

Table (3) Security incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan

| Degree | % | SD | М | |
|--------|------|-------|------|--------------------------------|
| High | 98.4 | 0.355 | 4.92 | My feeling of being safe and |
| | | | | secure motivates me to stay |
| High | 96.2 | 0.744 | 4.81 | Not being harmed by the |
| | | | | security services motivates |
| | | | | me to think about staying |
| High | 95.8 | 0.764 | 4.79 | My freedom to travel safety in |
| | | | | Jordan motivates me to think |
| | | | | about staying |
| High | 82.6 | 1.444 | 4.13 | My feeling that my rights are |
| | | | | protected motivates me to |
| | | | | think about staying |
| Medium | 46.4 | 1.763 | 2.32 | My freedom to freely express |
| | | | | my opinions freely motivates |
| | | | | me to think about staying |
| High | 83.9 | | 4.19 | Security indicators that |
| | | | | motivate you to stay in Jordan |

Second: Security incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to return to Syria

Data in table (4) show that the items represent the security incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to return to Syria scored high degrees (3.88-4.58) as the decision of the refugees return to their country is conditional on achievement of security and safety for them and family members and reforming security services in order that they

achieve their wish of a voluntary and security return; as the conditions of the voluntary return in their in country haven't been achieved, and Syria is not safe as the study sample confirms, and the result indicates that "The lack of security in Syria motivates me not to think about returning", where a large number of the sample study confirmed that even the regime is collapsed or changed, we won't return unless security and stability are achieved. This result agrees with the findings of Al-Omari study (2021) in one of its results, which confirmed that the most important security factors affecting the decision of returning of the refugees is their feeling of loss of security and stability in their country, and it also agrees with the results of the survey of Nama Center (2018) which revealed that (50%) of the Syrian refugees in Jordan "will not return" to their country because of the lack of security and stability there.

The results also show that compulsory military conscription does not motivate them to think about returning unless it is cancelled, as the respondents believe that canceling the conscription decision motivates them to return if it was canceled or made voluntarily

There are families who are afraid of making a decision to return for fear of their children who are wanted for compulsory military service, since military service will push their children to the battle fronts, which means certain death. This result agrees with the results of Al-Omary study (2021) which revealed that the most important security factor affecting their decision is that they are wanted to military service and it agrees with the survey by Nama Center (2018) that (12.3%) are fear of return because of the conscription. As for the results related to ensuring that I will not be pursued by the security forces that motivate me to think about return (1.36, 1.37), the study sample indicated that the security system in Syria cannot be trusted even if it pledged not to security pursue them. The previous results agree with Al-Rababah study (2022) findings that the conditions of any refugee's country form major motives of desire to return, and what mainly affect the refugees' decisions are safety and security in the original country.

Table (4) Security incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to return to Syria

| Degree | % | SD | М | |
|--------|------|-------|------|--|
| High | 91.6 | 1.209 | 4.58 | Lack of security in Syria motivates |
| | | | | me not to think about return |
| High | 83.8 | 1.602 | 4.19 | No-reform of security services motivates me not to think about return t |
| High | 77.6 | 1.798 | 3.88 | Being obliged to military service motivates me not to think about return |

| Low | 32.0 | 1.420 | 1.60 | The guarantee that I will not be pursued by the security forces motivates me to think about returning |
|--------|------|-------|------|---|
| Low | 27.4 | 1.150 | 1.37 | The release of the detained members of my family motivates me to return. |
| Medium | 62.5 | | 3.12 | Security incentives that motivate you to return to Syria |

The answer to the second question: What are the main prominent economic incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan and the incentives motivating them to return to their country? The following tables show this:

First: The economic incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan

Data in table (5) show that the Syrian refugees look for living ways for themselves and families, and the most prominent priority is securing their living needs, as the results indicate that the most prominent incentives to stay lie in obtaining a job in the host country, where throughout a job, the refugee is able to provide his family with basic needs. There is no doubt that the sample members think that their living conditions and available job opportunities were better than before Corona pandemic, and although they were difficult, they confirm that the opportunities were available especially since most of them are professionals and preferred - by Jordanian employers - over Jordanian and expatriate workers, due to their acceptance of long working hours at lower wages, but the pandemic lost them their income resources, so they think that providing them with job opportunities motivates them to stay especially they think that conditions in their country Syria don't motivate them to think about return, but they prefer to stay in Jordan. This result agrees with what the study by Al-Rababah (2022) has concluded that although the bad living conditions in the host communities, it is not possible for the refugees to return unless conditions in their country improve significantly.

Their obtaining of assistance by donors motivates them to stay, this assistance- whether they are financial or food- helps them to meet their needs, such as paying rent and securing food, which indicates the diversity of their sources of livelihood. This result agrees with the findings of Al-Omari study (2021) which revealed that the refugees receiving international assistances and aid encourage living in Jordan, and it agrees with one result of the survey by Nama Center (2018) which showed that the economic factors that help them to stay are assistances obtained from international organizations.

Although the result indicating that "My ability to manage my living affairs in Jordan motivates me to think about staying" got a medium degree of (2.33), the Syrian refugees are able to manage their living and they think that they are able to secure their resources of income which motivates them to stay, and they follow strategies to manage their living such as debts, borrowing from friends, relatives or close Jordanian and repaying them when possible, and receiving aid from their neighbors. Among negative strategies they follow to manage their living affairs are "more than one family living in a house to share in paying the rent, seeking to buy only their essential needs of food or clothing at cheap prices and they go to specific markets and shops for this purpose.

Table (5) Economic incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan

| Degree | % | SD | Mean | |
|--------|------|-------|------|---|
| High | 87.2 | 1.384 | 4.36 | Having a job in Jordan motivates me to think about staying |
| High | 74.9 | 1.796 | 3.74 | Food and financial aid that I get in Jordan motivates me to think about staying. |
| High | 46.5 | 1.026 | 2.33 | My ability to manage my living affairs in Jordan motivates me to think about staying. |
| Low | 30.5 | 1.311 | 1.52 | Obtaining a work permit with a small fee motivates me to think about staying |
| Low | 23.4 | 0.650 | 1.17 | The sufficiency of my income to meet my needs motivates me to think about staying. |
| Medium | 52.5 | | 2.62 | Economic indicators that motivate you to stay in Jordan |

Second: Economic incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to return to Syria

Date in table (6) show that the economic incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to return to Syria got high degrees (4.50-4.64) which are incentives for the Syrian refugees to return to their country provided that they are achieved over time, as returning of refugees is conditional on achieving their ability to secure their food needs, which is providing food security for citizens, and it is the Syrian state responsibility if it desires to achieve a safe return of Syrian refugees to their country, especially since the data from Table (6) indicates that the refugees' inability to meet their food needs motivates them not to think about returning, which is one of the most basic requirements for living. The previous result differs with the findings of (Yahya, 2018) study, which aimed to understand the attitudes of Syrian refugees in

Lebanon and Jordan towards return. The result also confirms, "The lack of basic services in Syria - gas, electricity, and water - motivates me not to think about returning", and this result is connected to the previous and subsequent results, as securing the basic services facilitates returning of refugees because they are main parts of their daily lives. The previous results are also agreeing with what (Mustafa et al.: 2021) study has concluded in that the improvement of the economic position is considered a motive to think about returning, and according to the study, the lack of infrastructure and basic services (electricity, water, gas ...etc.) and lowness of the living level were reflected on the Syrian refugees decisions and their options to stay outside Syria. The result is also connected to the low exchange rate of the Syrian lira which motivates the refugees not to think about returning, as the high inflation in Syria affected the poor and the weak disproportionately, where the food price inflation rate, according to the minimum food basket price index of the World Food Program, increased by (97%) during 2021, and this requires the Syrian state to increase government support for basic commodities, not to raise subsidies on them, where raising of subsidies on goods led to the deterioration of the living conditions of the Syrian people, which were basically deteriorating, which obstructs the refugees' thinking of the return. The result also related to the lack of job opportunities in Syria motivates me not to think about returning, as the refugees' leaving their country was among the main reasons such as the loss of security and the deterioration of the living conditions of citizens. The previous results also agree with one of the Nama Center survey (2018) results In Syria in that (7%) thought that living conditions are very bad, and therefore it is difficult for them to return unless conditions improve.

Economic incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to return to Syria.

| Degree | % | SD | M | |
|--------|------|-------|------|--|
| High | 92.8 | 1.104 | 4.64 | My inability to meet my food needs |
| | | | | motivates me not to think about |
| | | | | returning |
| High | 92.3 | 1.098 | 4.62 | The lack of basic services in Syria |
| | | | | motivates me not to think about |
| | | | | returning |
| High | 91.8 | 1.134 | 4.59 | The low exchange rate of the Syrian |
| | | | | pound motivates me not to think |
| | | | | about returning |
| High | 91.1 | 1.147 | 4.56 | The lack of job opportunities in Syria |
| | | | | motivates me not to think about |
| | | | | returning |
| High | 90.0 | 1.247 | 4.50 | The high prices in Syria motivate me |
| | | | | not to think about returning |

| High | 91.6 | 4.58 | The following economic indicators |
|------|------|------|-----------------------------------|
| | | | motivate you to return to your |
| | | | country, Syria |

The answer to the third question: What are the most prominent social incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan and return to the mother country? The following tables show that:

First: Social incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan

Data in the following below show that all items representing the social incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan got high degrees (4.05-4.67), where the item "Presence of my family members in Jordan motivates me to think about staying" got the highest degree, as this result shows that the Syrian refugees sought to keep the union of their families and reunite them in host Jordanian society, and the presence of the family members together reinforces the feel of tranquility in the asylum country which motivates them to stay in.

The results also reveal that the Syrian refugees are socially integrated into the Jordanian society, where the results show that "friendship relations with Jordanians motivate them to think about staying, and the participation of my Jordanian neighbors in their occasions (weddings and sorrows) motivates me to think about staying." This social integration makes the process of refugee stay easy in Jordan because of the similarity and closeness between the two communities related to customs and traditions, while the item that indicates "Jordanians help in my problems I face motivates me to think about staying," got a medium degree of (3.25), and this result shows that the Syrian refugees do not live isolated in their host Jordanian society, since a refugee finds someone who provides him with help and assistance.

As for the item "Presence of my relatives in Jordan motivates me to think about staying" got a low degree of (2), as the researchers found a weakness in relationships and communication among the Syrian refugees relatives, and this due to - as explained by the refugees themselves- the heaviness of burdens facing them, and every family is busy securing its needs and it is unable to help other families. On the contrary, we found a tendency, attention, visits and a desire for communication among the Syrian refugees families and Jordanian families, as a lot of the sample members confirmed that the reason behind the communication is Jordanians' generosity and their feeling of the refugees' crises they face, and their wish to stay because of what they find of sympathy, support and communication by the Jordanians. This result agrees with what Nama Center (2018) has concluded in that (67%) of the Syrian refugees feel very welcome in Jordan which motivates them to stay.

Table (7) Social incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan

| Degree | % | SD | M | |
|--------|------|-------|------|---|
| High | 93.5 | 0.996 | 4.67 | The presence of my family members in |
| | | | | Jordan motivates me to think about |
| | | | | staying. |
| High | 84.9 | 1.435 | 4.24 | Friendship with Jordanians motivates |
| | | | | me to think about staying |
| High | 81.0 | 1.499 | 4.05 | Participation of my Jordanian neighbors |
| | | | | motivates me to think about staying |
| High | 65.0 | 1.842 | 3.25 | The Jordanians' help motivates me to |
| | | | | think about staying |
| High | 40.0 | 1.663 | 2.00 | The presence of my relatives in Jordan |
| | | | | motivates me to think about staying. |
| High | 72.8 | | 3.64 | Social indicators that motivate you to |
| | | | | stay in Jordan |

Third: Social incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to return to Syria

Data in the table below show that all the items representing the social incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to return to Syria got low degrees (1.21-1.64), which are conditional incentives on achieving security and stability in their country Syria, as the item which indicates "My wish to reunite my family members motivates me to think about returning" got the highest degrees, where most of the study sample agree on their desire to reunite their families in Jordan, not in Syria, and they confirm that their families or some members of them who are in living in Syria don't encourage them to return, and the study sample confirms that the families that wished to reunite in Syria after returning were not able to achieve their goal as the Syrian authorities did not allow them to return to their places.

The order of the rest of the incentives came as follows: "My desire for my family members/relatives/friends to participate in their occasions motivates me to think of returning. In spite of the importance of the sample members participating in their families, relatives, or friends with their occasions in Syria, the deteriorating security reality does not contribute to achieving this participation. The Syrian refugees realize that the security reality was reflected on all aspects of their lives in detail, and this result got a low degree. As for presence of members of "my family in Syria motivates me to think about returning", they think that the members of their families in Syria do not advise them to return because of what they face of hardship and loss of hope. Regarding the result of "My continuous communication with family members in Syria motivates me to think about returning", This result showed communication with their family members inside Syria may lead to their arrest or torture, where a great number of the sample

members indicated that the reason behind weakness of communication is most of the refugees are wanted to the Syrian security services, some of them are sentenced to death, communications whether by mobiles or e-mails are monitored by the security services and numbers of their family members and relatives were arrested because of a message received from one of his family members or relatives in the asylum county.

Table (8) Social incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to return to Syria

| Degree | % | SD | М | | | | | | |
|--------|------|-------|------|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| High | 32.9 | 1.453 | 1.64 | My desire to reunite with my family | | | | | |
| | | | | motivates me to think about returning | | | | | |
| High | 27.3 | 1.131 | 1.37 | My desire for my | | | | | |
| | | | | family/relatives/friends to participate | | | | | |
| | | | | in their occasions motivates me to | | | | | |
| | | | | think about returning | | | | | |
| High | 26.6 | 1.085 | 1.33 | The presence of a member of my family | | | | | |
| | | | | in Syria motivates me to think about | | | | | |
| | | | | returning | | | | | |
| High | 24.2 | 0.884 | 1.21 | My continuous communication with | | | | | |
| | | | | my family members who are in Syria | | | | | |
| | | | | motivates me to think about returning | | | | | |
| High | 27.7 | 1.453 | 1.39 | Social indicators that motivate you to | | | | | |
| | | | | return to Syria | | | | | |

The answer to the fourth question: Are there any statistical significant differences among the study sample due to the variables of the study towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay or return for the Syrian refugees?

First: According to the gender, the following table shows no differences among the study sample members according to the gender towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay in Jordan, and there were differences among the study sample members according to the gender towards the security, economic and social incentives of the Syrian refugees returning to their country, where the differences were for the males, and this may due to the presence of their interests in their country such as houses and properties, and taking care of their families in Syria.

Table (9) Differences according to the gender

| P-value | df | Т | SD | M | N | Gender | |
|---------|-----|-------|-------|------|-----|--------|----------------------|
| 0.175* | 398 | 1.359 | 0.489 | 3.50 | 346 | Male | Incentives |
| | | | 0.514 | 3.40 | 54 | Female | to stay in Jordan |
| 0.000* | 398 | 7.447 | 0.485 | 3.11 | 346 | Male | |

| | 0.984 | 2.49 | 54 | Female | Incentive |
|--|-------|------|----|--------|-----------|
| | | | | | to return |
| | | | | | to Syria |

Second: According to the variable of work: the following table shows differences among the study sample members according to variable of work towards the security, economic and social incentives of stay, as the results were for non-workers, and the reason may due to that they receive aid by the donors. The results also showed no differences among the study sample members according to the variables of the security, economic and social incentives to return.

Table (10) Differences according to the variable of work

| Sig. | F | df | Std. | Mean | N | | Incentives |
|---------|--------|----|-----------|------|-----|-----------|------------|
| | | | Deviation | | | | to stay |
| 0.007* | 5.0080 | 2 | 0.581 | 3.49 | 34 | With a | |
| | | | | | | permit | |
| | | | 0.568 | 3.35 | 98 | Without a | |
| | | | | | | permit | |
| | | | 0.443 | 3.53 | 268 | I don't | |
| | | | | | | work | |
| | | | 0.493 | 3.49 | 400 | Total | |
| 0.5180* | 0.6600 | 2 | 0.721 | 2.97 | 34 | With a | Incentives |
| | | | | | | permit | to return |
| | | | 0.540 | 3.09 | 98 | Without a | |
| | | | | | | permit | |
| | | | 0.628 | 3.02 | 268 | I don't | |
| | | | | | | work | |
| | | | 0.615 | 3.03 | 400 | Total | |
| | | | | | | | |

Significant at the level of (*P≤0.05)

Third: According to the variable of qualification: The following table shows no differences among the study sample members according to the variable of qualification towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay, and it shows differences among the study sample members according to the variable of qualification towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay, as the results were for those who hold the BA, and this may due to their presence in jobs and careers in their country.

Table (11) Differences according to the variable of qualification

| P- | F | df | SD | M | N | | |
|--------|-------|----|-------|------|-----|-----------|------------|
| value | | | | | | | |
| 0.092* | 2.396 | 2 | 0.478 | 3.50 | 377 | Less than | Incentives |
| | | | | | | secondary | to stay in |
| | | | 0.761 | 3.21 | 13 | Tawjihi | Jordan |

| | | | 0.593 | 3.38 | 10 | BA | |
|--------|-------|---|-------|------|-----|-----------|------------|
| | | | 0.493 | 3.49 | 400 | Total | |
| 0.023* | 3.790 | 2 | 0.594 | 3.03 | 377 | Less than | Incentives |
| | | | | | | secondary | to return |
| | | | 0.826 | 2.65 | 13 | Tawjihi | to Syria |
| | | | 0.923 | 3.34 | 10 | BA | |
| | | | 0.615 | 3.03 | 400 | Total | |

Fourth: According to the marital status: The following table shows no differences among the study sample members according to the marital status towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay, and it shows differences among the study sample members according to the marital status towards the security, economic and social incentives to return. The results were for non-married related to the incentives to return.

Table (12) Differences due to the variable of marital status

| P- value | F | df | SD | M | N | | |
|-------------|--------|----|-------|------|-----|----------|------------|
| | | _ | | | _ | | |
| 0.093* | 2.151 | 3 | 0.384 | 3.22 | 9 | Single | Incentives |
| | | | 0.488 | 3.51 | 353 | Married | to stay in |
| | | | 0.457 | 3.53 | 8 | Divorced | Jordan |
| | | | 0.560 | 3.32 | 30 | Widower | |
| | | | 0.493 | 3.49 | 400 | Total | |
| 0.000* | 21.123 | 3 | 0.311 | 3.25 | 9 | Single | Incentives |
| | | | 0.520 | 3.10 | 353 | Married | to return |
| | | | 0.865 | 2.58 | 8 | Divorced | to Syria |
| | | | 1.000 | 2.27 | 30 | Widower | |
| | | | 0.615 | 3.03 | 400 | Total | |

Significant at the level of (*P≤0.05)

Fifth: According to the variable of age: The following table shows differences among the study sample towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay, and this may due to their integration in the host community, the presence of a job and the wish to build a detached house. The results were for those who are more than 45 years. There were no differences among the study sample according to the variable of age towards the security, economic and social incentives to return.

Table (13) Differences according the variable of age

| P-value | F | df | SD | М | N | | |
|---------|-------|----|-------|------|-----|-------|------------|
| 0.002* | 6.222 | 2 | 0.653 | 3.35 | 65 | Less | Incentives |
| | | | | | | than | to stay in |
| | | | | | | 36 | Jordan |
| | | | 0.503 | 3.45 | 167 | From | |
| | | | | | | 36-45 | |

| | | | 0.386 | 3.58 | 168 | More than 45 | |
|--------|-------|---|-------|------|-----|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | | | 0.493 | 3.49 | 400 | Total | |
| 0.586* | 0.535 | 2 | 0.624 | 2.97 | 65 | Less than 36 | Incentives to return to Syria |
| | | | 0.603 | 3.02 | 167 | From 36-45 | |
| | | | 0.626 | 3.06 | 168 | More than 45 | |
| | | | 0.615 | 3.03 | 400 | Total | |

Sixth: According to the variable of family income: The following table shows no differences among the study sample members according to the variable of family income towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay and return, and this may due to the difficult living conditions facing in the host community and their country if they decide to return.

Table (14) Differences according to family income

| P-value | df | T | SD | M | N | Gender | |
|---------|-----|-------|-------|------|-----|---------|------------|
| 0.446* | 398 | 0.763 | 0.488 | 3.49 | 363 | Less | Incentives |
| | | | | | | than | to stay in |
| | | | | | | 300 | Jordan |
| | | | 0.551 | 3.43 | 37 | 300-600 | |
| 0.297* | 398 | 0.297 | 0.599 | 3.04 | 363 | Less | Incentives |
| | | | | | | than | to return |
| | | | | | | 300 | to Syria |
| | | | 0.759 | 2.93 | 37 | 300-600 | |

Significant at the level of (*P≤0.05)

Eighth: According to the number of the family members: The following table shows differences among the study sample members according to the variable of number of the family members towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay or return, as the differences were for those with more than 9 family members. This can be due to the presence of the family members in the host community and family members in their mother country.

Table (15) Differences according to the number of the family members

| P- | F | df | SD | M | N | | |
|--------|--------|----|-------|------|-----|---------|------------|
| value | | | | | | | |
| 0.029* | 3.560 | | 0.572 | 3.33 | 51 | 4 | Incentives |
| | | | | | | members | to stay |
| | | 2 | | | | or less | |
| | | | 0.465 | 3.50 | 274 | 5-8 | |
| | | | | | | members | |
| | | | 0.518 | 3.56 | 75 | 9 | |
| | | | | | | members | |
| | | | | | | or more | |
| | | | 0.493 | 3.49 | 400 | Total | |
| 0.000* | 10.141 | 2 | 0.768 | 2.77 | 51 | 4 | Incentives |
| | | | | | | members | to return |
| | | | | | | or less | |
| | | | 0.563 | 3.02 | 274 | 5-8 | |
| | | | | | | members | |
| | | | 0.612 | 3.25 | 75 | 9 | |
| | | | | | | members | |
| | | | | | | or more | |
| | | | 0.615 | 3.03 | 400 | Total | |

Ninth: According to the variable number of years of residence in Jordan: The following table shows no differences among the study sample according to the variable number of years of residence in Jordan towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay or return and this may due to the similarity in living conditions facing them if they stay and the same fate if they return.

Table (16) Differences according to the variable number of years of residence in Jordan

| P-value | F | df | Sd | M | N | | |
|---------|-------|----|-------|------|-----|-------|------------|
| 0.357* | 1.033 | 2 | 0.762 | 3.13 | 4 | 1-3 | Stay |
| | | | 0.544 | 3.49 | 8 | 4-7 | indicators |
| | | | 0.490 | 3.49 | 388 | 8 and | |
| | | | | | | over | |
| | | | 0.493 | 3.49 | 400 | Total | |
| 0.454* | 0.792 | 2 | 0.240 | 3.18 | 4 | 1-3 | Return |
| | | | 0.776 | 2.78 | 8 | 4-7 | indicators |
| | | | 0.615 | 3.03 | 388 | 8 and | |
| | | | | | | over | |
| | | | 0.615 | 3.03 | 400 | Total | |

Significant at the level of (*P≤0.05)

Eleventh: According to the variable of living condition in Syria: The following table shows no differences among the study sample according to the variable of living condition in Syria towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay or return, and this a logical result and it may due to that the Syrian refugees face very difficult living conditions in both societies such as poverty, unemployment, lowness of living level and deprivation.

Table (17) Differences according to the variable of living condition in Syria

| P- value | F | df | SD | M | N | | |
|-------------|-------|----|-------|------|-----|------------|------------|
| 0.225* | 1.224 | 4 | | 3.93 | 1 | Excellent | Incentives |
| | | | | 3.67 | 1 | Good | to stay |
| | | | | 2.73 | 1 | Acceptable | |
| | | | 0.737 | 3.29 | 15 | Bad | |
| | | | 0.481 | 3.49 | 382 | Unbearable | |
| | | | 0.493 | 3.49 | 400 | Total | |
| 0.079* | 2.108 | 4 | | 3.13 | 1 | Excellent | Incentives |
| | | | | 1.27 | 1 | Good | to return |
| | | | | 2.87 | 1 | Acceptable | |
| | | | 0.546 | 3.01 | 15 | Bad | |
| | | | 0.614 | 3.03 | 382 | Unbearable | |
| | | | 0.615 | 3.03 | 400 | Total | |

Twelfth: According to the living condition in Jordan: The following table shows no differences among the study sample according to the variable of living condition in Jordan towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay or return. The differences were for those who think that the living condition in Jordan is excellent related to the incentives to stay, and this may due to that although the difficult living condition in Jordan, the Syrian refugees are able to manage their income resource and for those who think that the living condition is bad related to incentives to return to Syria. This result may due to that some refugees are not able to get a job to secure their needs, in addition to presence of their interests in Syria.

Table (18) Differences according to the variable of living condition in Jordan

| P- | F | df | SD | М | N | | |
|--------|-------|----|-------|------|-----|------------|------------|
| value | | | | | | | |
| 0.000* | 5.609 | 4 | 0.094 | 3.73 | 2 | Excellent | Incentives |
| | | | 0.607 | 3.16 | 18 | Good | to stay |
| | | | 0.569 | 3.54 | 33 | Acceptable | |
| | | | 0.648 | 3.30 | 67 | Bad | |
| | | | 0.413 | 3.54 | 280 | Unbearable | |
| | | | 0.493 | 3.49 | 400 | Total | |

| 0.044* | 2.471 | 4 | 1.697 | 2.47 | 2 | Excellent | Incentives |
|--------|-------|---|-------|------|-----|------------|------------|
| | | | 0.914 | 2.77 | 18 | Good | to return |
| | | | 0.758 | 2.83 | 33 | Acceptable | |
| | | | 0.534 | 3.09 | 67 | Bad | |
| | | | 0.578 | 3.06 | 280 | Unbearable | |
| | | | 0.615 | 3.03 | 400 | Total | |

Thirteenth: According to the variable of desire to return to Syria: The following table shows no differences among the study sample members according to the variable of desire to return to Syria towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay or return.

Table (19) Differences according to the variable of desire to return to Syria

| P- | F | Df | SD | М | N | | Indicators |
|--------|-------|----|-------|------|-----|-----------|------------|
| value | | | | | | | of stay |
| 0.069* | 2.699 | 2 | 0.419 | 3.28 | 9 | I want | |
| | | | 0.486 | 3.50 | 380 | I don't | |
| | | | | | | want | |
| | | | 0.685 | 3.21 | 11 | I haven't | |
| | | | | | | decided | |
| | | | | | | yet | |
| | | | 0.493 | 3.49 | 400 | Total | |
| 0.323* | 1.133 | 2 | 1.235 | 3.16 | 9 | I want | Indicators |
| | | | 0.587 | 3.03 | 380 | I don't | of |
| | | | | | | want | returning |
| | | | 0.857 | 2.78 | 11 | I haven't | |
| | | | | | | decided | |
| | | | | | | yet | |
| | | | 0.615 | 3.03 | 400 | Total | |

Significant at the level of (*P≤0.05)

Fourteenth: According to the variable of desire to stay in Jordan: The following table shows differences among the study sample members according to the variable of desire to stay in Jordan towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay and return, as the differences were for those who have the desire to stay in Jordan related to the incentives to stay, and for those who have no desire to stay in Jordan related to the incentives to return to Syria.

Table (20) Differences according to the variable of desire to stay in Jordan

| P- value | F | Df | SD | M | N | | Indicators of stay |
|-------------|--------|----|-------|------|-----|---------|--------------------|
| 0.000* | 18.872 | 2 | 0.392 | 3.59 | 260 | I want | |
| | | | 0.630 | 3.44 | 3 | I don't | |
| | | | | | | want | |

| | | | 0.594 | 3.29 | 137 | I haven't decided yet | |
|--------|-------|---|-------|------|-----|-----------------------------|------------|
| | | | 0.493 | 3.49 | 400 | Total | |
| 0.006* | 5.211 | 2 | 0.563 | 3.08 | 260 | I want | Indicators |
| | | | 1.206 | 3.73 | 3 | I don't | of |
| | | | | | | want | returning |
| | | | 0.677 | 2.92 | 137 | I haven't | |
| | | | | | | decided | |
| | | | | | | yet | |
| | | | 0.615 | 3.03 | 400 | Total | |

Fourteenth: According to the variable of desire to stay in Jordan, the following table shows differences among the study sample members based on the variable of desire to stay in Jordan towards the security, economic and social incentives to stay or return, where the differences were for those wishing to stay in Jordan regarding the incentives to stay, and for those who have no desire to stay in Jordan regarding the incentives to return to Syria.

Conclusion

The study aimed to identify the security, economic and social incentives that motivate the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan and return to their mother country, where the study revealed that (95%) of the study sample which consisted of (400) members do not have the desire to return and (2.3%) have the desire to return, against (65%) want to stay, while (0.8%) think that they do not want to stay and (34.3%) haven't decided to stay yet. It is observed through the results that the study concluded that the Syrian refugees the Syrian refugees not only prefer to stay in Jordan, but rather (through what the researchers observed) that there is a decision among the Syrian refugees not to return completely due to the presence of attractive incentives, whereas the majority of the study sample refuse to return due to the existence of repellent and discouraging incentives in their country of origin for their return including the security, economic and social ones, which means that the host community (Jordan) has attractive factors, while there are very repellent factors to the refugees in their country Syria represented in the lowness of living condition and loss of hope which affected on the social relationships, and inability to reunite the family inside Syria which depends on the time condition for its change, in other words one of the refugees' options is -starting from the study results- is to stay in Jordan, which the best scenario, then return to Syria depends on conditions that have not yet been met, and from this standpoint, the current study suggests to work on the economic integration of refugees into the formal and informal labor market completely, although, under the

Labor Force Agreement of (2001) between Syria and Jordan, it enabled Syrians who arrived after 2011 to access immediately to the labor market, and this legal opportunity allowed Syrian refugees immediate access to the private sector and self-employment. However, this did not ensure the access of all Syrian refugees to the labor market with safe conditions and obtain support related to employment because the international community abandoned Jordan's support as it bears the high cost of the Syrian refugee alone, and this requires to fulfill Jordan's demands presented to the Syria Support Conference known as the (London) 2016 conference, as this formed a high pressure on services and intensive competition between Jordanians and the Syrian refugees on the informal work; as the Jordanian legal legislations do not represent an obstacle for Syrians' integration economically , but the real problem is that the weak financial capabilities of Jordan, although Jordan asked for more foreign investment and open the European Union market to Jordanian exports to reduce the Syrian asylum influences since Jordan has large financial needs of its own, exacerbated by conflict in the region, as the fulfillment of Jordanian demands that the international community pledged cause positive changes in the economic conditions at the whole level of the country through reducing the level of debt and funding gap in particular, and any improvement in economy will contribute to creating more job opportunities that may benefit Jordanians and Syrians together, and so make it easy for the Syrian refugees to stay in Jordan instead of flowing towards Europe.

Bibliography

- 1- Absus (2018) Analyzing the reality of gender in refugee situations: the situation of Syrian refugee women in Jordan. Edited by Rachel Dorr, United Nations Women, Regional Office for Arab States.
- 2- Abu Tair, Maida (2017) Refugees Will they return to Syria? Available at https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2017-03-05-1.2876759
- 3- Achilli, Luigi (2016) Back to Syria?: Conflicting patterns of mobility among Syrian refugees in Jordan. CADMUS, 57(1): 7-13. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/38826
- 4- Al-Suleman, Ayham (2018) The intention of Syrian Refugees in the UK to Return home and the Role of transnationalism. Unpublished Master Thesis, University of Oxford Brookes. https://www.academia.edu/40829137/ The intention of Syrian refugees in the UK to return home and the role of transnationalism
- 5- Al-Hourani, Mohammed Abdul Kareem (2017) The Burdens of Syrian Asylum and the Entitlements of the Jordanian National Identity from the Perspective of the Cultural Trauma. Journal of Social Sciences, 45 (3): 294-321.

- 6- Al-Malahi, Ruba (2018) Mutual Social Relationships between Jordanian Citizens and Syrian Refugees: A Sociological Study of Acceptance and Rejection Factors. Unpublished master's thesis, Yarmouk University, Faculty of Arts.
- 7- Al-Mansi, Ahmed, and Mahafza, Mohammed (2018) The future of Syrian refugees in Jordan, paper submitted to the Refugee Conference in the Middle East Research of the Third International Conference: The International Community: Opportunities and Challenges. Yarmouk University, Jordan, 171-186.
- 8- Al-Omari, Eman (2021) Factors Influencing the Decision to Return to Syrian Refugees in Jordan, Unpublished Master Thesis, Yarmouk University - Department of Sociology and Social Work, Amman, Jordan.
- 9- Al-Qabas Kuwaiti newspaper, "Hunger in Syria has reached "record" levels, a report issued by the United Nations World Food Program, January 27-2023. https://alqabas.com/article/5904913
- 10- Arman, Ahmed, and Lotfi Shatha (2019) Returning to Syria after evading conscription, Forced Migration Bulletin, (62), October, accessed on 3/5/2022, https://www.fmreview.org/ sites/fmr/files/FMR downloads/ar/return/araman-loutfi.pdf
- 11- Barakat, Sultan and Al-Kahlout, Ghassan (2017) The return of Syrian refugees from neighboring host countries, lessons and examples from similar global experiences. Arab Policy magazine, (49): 7-21.
- 12- Chalabi, Sultan (2017) Future Trends among Syrians in Gaziantep, Turkey: A Field Study. Hermon Center for Contemporary Studies and the Syrian Association for Social Sciences.
- 13- Connable, Ben(2015) From Negative to Positive Stability, How the Syrian Refugee Crisis Can Improve Jordan's Outlook. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, file:///C:/Users/dell/Downloads/RAND RR1069%20(2).pdf
- 14- Edwards, Madeline and Al-Hourani, Noura (2019) Weighed down by economic woes, Syrian refugees head home from Jordan. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/11/19/Syrian-refugees-return-Jordan
- 15- Eric, Stephen & Hillison (2015) The Effects of the Influx of Syrian Refugees into the Jordanian Labor Market. International Labor Organization, FAFO.
- 16- Erik, Stave & Solveig Hillesund (2015) Impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labour market. Findings from the governorates of Amman, Irbid and Mafraq International Labour Organization Regional Office for the Arab States and Fafo. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--arabstates/---ro-Beirut/documents/publication/wcms_364162.pdf
- 17- Fayyad, Hashem N'man (2018) Theoritical concepts in population migration: an analytical comparative study. Imran Journal, (26): 7-35.
- 18- Francis, Alexandra (2015) The Refugee Crisis in Jordan. Malcolm Kerr-Carnegie Middle East Center. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Francis_Jordan_Refugee_Crisis_EN.pdf

- 19- Government of Jordan, ministry of planning and international cooperation. The Jordan Response Plan for the Syrian Crisis 2017-2019, February 2017, https://www.jrp.gov.jo/Files/JRP2017-2019.pdf
- 20- ILO Regional Office for Arab States (2015) Access to work for Syrian refugees in Jordan: a discussion paper on labor and refugee laws and policies. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/--ro-Beirut/documents/publication/wcms_357950.pdf . Accessed on 11/8/2022
- 21- International Labor Organization (2015) The influence of the Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labor market.
- 22- Jafra News (2016) One Hundred Days After the London Conference: The Results Are Modest.
- 23- Jordan compact (2016) The Jordan Compact: A new holistic approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis. Press release,7 February.
- 24- Jordanian Ministry of Planning. The Jordanian response plan to the Syrian Crisis for the Years 2020-2022.
- 25- Juma, Mohammed Ali (2017) The Syrian Family and Its Values between Inheritance and Forgery. Ministry of Culture, 55 (640), 12-26.
- 26- Memorandum of Understanding between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, signed in 1998 and amended in 2014.
- 27- Norwegian Refugee Council (2016) Thousands of refugees return to Syria from Jordan. Thousands of refugees return to Syria from Jordan | NRC
- 28- Numan, Abeer (2015) Syrian refugees bear brunt of 'high living expenses. IOM official | Jordan Times.
- 29- REACH Initiative(2015). Access to Education for Syrian Refugee Children and Youth in Jordan Host Communities- Joint Education Needs Assessment Report.
- 30- Shtaiwi, Musa (2017) Syrian Refugees and Jordanian Citizens: Perceptions and Attitudes. Survey study, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan.
- 31- The Syrian Network for Human Rights. The Tenth Annual Report on Enforced Disappearances in Syria on the International Day of Victims of Enforced Disappearance, August 30, 2021. https://snhr.org/blog/2021/08/30/56733/
- 32- UNHCR (2020) GLOBAL TRENDS,FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2020. https://www.unhcr.org/media/unhcr-global-trends-2019
- 33- UNHCR (2020) Global, trends, forced, displacement in 2020. https://www.unhcr.org/media/unhcr-global-trends-2019
- 34- UNHCR and UN Development Program(2015). 3RP Regional Progress Report (June 2015) https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arabrepublic/3rp-regional-progress-report-june-2015
- 35- Yahya, Maha (2018) The Syrian refugees in Jordan- rights and security and demographic concern Malcolm Kerr-Carnegie Middle East Center. https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/28/ar-pub-76233%20-

- 36- Hanifat, Ammar Raja (2020) Criminal Liability for Endangering Third Parties by Transmitting Coronavirus Infection (COVID-19) Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan Journal for Legal Studies, Volume(1), Issue(1) (79-102). http://zijls.zuj.edu.jo/PapersUploaded/4.pdf
- 37- Albanna,Lina(2021)Human Rights Guarantees under the State of Emergency in the Jordanian Legislation, Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan Journal for Legal Studies, Volume(2),Issue(3).(180-208) http://zjjls.zuj.edu.jo/PapersUploaded/v2_I3/8.pdf