Affiliation Of Security And Development (Kesban) Concept And Counterinsurgency Theories

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Abstract

Global academic intellectuals had come to an agreement that the nexus between security and development is not a new matter of concern. At the United Nations level, this allegiance has been embellished by denoting that "there is no security without development; there is no development without security." However, in Malaysia this has been a combative concept applied to prostrate the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) to surrender their militant business. The concept was inspired from British countermeasures against communist insurgency during the First Malayan Emergency. Successive to that the Malaysian government formulated security and development concept called "Keselamatan dan Pembangunan" (KESBAN) to pursue the battle against CPM. The aim of this paper is to analyse the affiliation of KESBAN concept with three leading counterinsurgency theories introduced by Thompson, Galula, and Kilcullen. The paper will adopt a qualitative approach supported by secondary data in its analysis. The paper will attempt to describe each of the theories vis-à-vis KESBAN concept. The distinctiveness of this concept is that it has vast similarity with the famous counterinsurgency theories. The finding had established that KESBAN concept and the highlighted counterinsurgency theories correspond as a

counterinsurgency framework capable to fight an insurgency.

Keyword: Security and Development; Malayan Emergency; Insurgency; Counterinsurgency Theories; British Countermeasures.

Introduction

Many international scholars had conceded that the linkage between security and development is not new alliance, but there has been growing acknowledgment that since the end of the Cold War, the connections between these two policy fields have changed (McNeish & Lie, 2010). It had allowed the development discourse to re-establish earlier concerns with poverty and post-conflict reconstruction and venturing for the security sector to share in the development backdrop. While both fields were precisely connected to the past, the relationship is opportunistic, prepared towards national interests, and often clandestinely. This as disclosed has changed to be more transparent, inclusive, and more organic (Duffield, 2007). But, for Malaysia, security and development has been a significant concept applied to battle the communist insurgency during the Second Malayan Emergency (1969-1989) that had compelled the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) laid down its militant and subversive activities against the Government and the people of Malaysia. Based on the conviction that Communism (especially in the 3rd world countries) born and develops thriving on poverty (Tolhurst, 2018), the concept had also managed the problem of poverty among the population as well as national development in the context of national security.

This paper is intended to analyse the alliances and relationship between classical security and development (Keselamatan dan Pembangunan – KESBAN) concept against the counterinsurgency theories promulgated by famous counterinsurgency gurus: Robert Thompson, David Galula, and David Kilcullen. The paper will attempt to annotate KESBAN as a counterinsurgency concept of its meaning, strategy, components, types, and emphasis. It will then expound the three notable counterinsurgency theories popularised by Thompson, Galula, and Kilcullen. The paper will then analyse the nexus between KESBAN and the three counterinsurgency theories. The paper shall adopt a qualitative approach in its methodology supported by mostly secondary data-based documentary evidence derived from books, articles, internet sources, lecture notes, publications, and online news report.

Annotation of Security and Development (KESBAN) Concept

Security and development (KESBAN) was a classical counterinsurgency concept advocated by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) regarding threats to Malaysian national security. It was

introduced as a statement by the late Tun Abdul Razak Hussien, the Second Prime Minister of Malaysia during his address to the first cohort of the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College students in 1971. His remarks during the address were;

"…the primary task of armed forces is to fight the communists, but at the same time, they must also assist in the implementation of the government development plan. This is part of the fight against communists. Defence and development must go hand in hand"

The key words in this statement "defense and development", a brain wave concept was formulated as a new concept in fighting against the communist terrorists and to curb the communist ideology and threats against national security. In simple terms, the Malaysian security forces will have to create a secure environment to ensure that the development projects in the country can be carried out without any hindrance (Nordin,1990). The concept was then manifested as KESBAN, coined from two Malay words – **Kes**elamatan dan Pem**ban**gunan (NSC Instruction No.11, 1980). The concept was inspired by the British countermeasures against the communist terrorists or Malayan Communist Party (MCP) during the First Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and some lessons learned from the American experience in Vietnam (Higgins, 2001).

Fundamental thrust of KESBAN

The fundamental thrust of KESBAN is towards preventing insurgency from escalating into becoming a major threat to national security. The prevention is achieved by defeating the threat created by the insurgent organizations by government presence in the contested areas, especially in the rural and aboriginal concentrated areas. The fundamental of KESBAN emphasizes the participation of the population in internal security and development efforts. The internal security (IS) and internal development (IDEV) strengthened by the hearts and minds program form an overall KESBAN counterinsurgency strategy. The IS aspect is the province of the armed and uniformed security forces, and the IDEV aspect involves all the civil governmental departments responsible for the development of the country.

The Internal Security

Internal security is the full range of measures taken by the government to free and protect society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (Malaysian Army Manual of Land Warfare, 1984). KESBAN strategy involves the art and science of developing and employing the elements of national power to deny insurgency and its ideological influence. The concept is on the strategy of concurrent internal security and internal development programs. The primary objective of the internal security strategy is the domination of the internal security agenda which incline to permit economic, political, and social growth granting balanced development to take place. It is

designed to provide an atmosphere of internal security and relative peace within which development efforts can materialise. The level of emphasis on internal security will vary according to the intensity of insurgent activities and the extent of their influence. The programs are directed toward both the population, as well as the insurgents.

The national strategy directed at the population includes the action plans taken in correcting the space the insurgents would exploit to promote insurgency. The security forces may assist in winning the confidence of the people by providing security, but it must be accompanied by a positive economic, social, and political strategy to improve the people's condition. The strategy must include measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can occur (Malaysian Army Doctrine, 1984).

The national strategy to eliminate the insurgency must be directed to isolate the insurgents from the population, both physically and psychologically in order to deny them from getting recruits, material, and intelligence support. This is the countermeasure introduced and adopted by General Briggs, through his famous Briggs Plan. As counterinsurgency experts put it, "Guerrilla is like fish swimming in the sea, if the water is drained, the fish will die on its own".[1] The quote connotes that the insurgent is like fish and population is the water. If the population is separated from the insurgents, the guerrillas will not be able to survive. In the words of Balance, "without them the guerrilla fighters, like a fish out of water, gasps helplessly until he dies" (Barber, 1971). Psychological operations form the major portion of this strategy. Internal security also includes tactical security operations aimed at eliminating and neutralizing insurgent's leadership, organisations, their tactical forces, as well as their underground elements known as Min Yuen. KESBAN internal security operations involve the following aspects (Malaysian Army Doctrine, 1984), firstly, the intelligence operations, which include the collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination of available information with regards to all aspects of insurgent movement are essential to successful KESBAN operations. The intelligence system should be integrated and centralized. Peter Edwards, the official historian of Australia's role in the Malayan and Vietnam conflicts, commented in his study on Malayan Emergency that "the most important weapon in counter-insurgency was intelligence" (Edwards, 1992). In the national context of fighting insurgency warfare, it is the intelligence that drove the security operations.

Secondly, the tactical operations conducted in KESBAN backdrop, which are most violent and extreme. They are rarely conducted as

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[1] The most important of this contribution is the necessity of the population's support in guerrilla warfare. Mao famously observed that a guerrilla swims among the people like a fish swim in the sea. Without the support of the people the guerrilla is a fish out of water, "it cannot survive" (Tse-Tung, 1961).

independent sporadic actions. They are usually part of a larger campaign and coordinated with other KESBAN movements toward the attainment of broader objectives. The aim of tactical operations focused on separating the insurgents from their supporters and the population, gaining people's support for government causes, and destruction of the insurgents. Usually, KESBAN tactical operations are conducted in the form of framework operations or strike operations. Framework operations are day-to-day operations, both offensive and defensive in nature. It is conducted due to limited manpower and economy of force operations on short terms continuous basis. Examples of framework operations are OPS SETIA, OPS INDERA, OPS PAGAR, and OPS KOTA. While strike operations are conducted to find, fix, and destroy insurgent tactical forces or guerrilla groups and are normally offensive in nature, usually in the form of joint operations, where the targets are identified and the security forces conduct strike operations onto the identified target. Examples of joint strike operations are OPS DAOYAI MUSNAH, SELAMAT SAWADEE, CAHAYA BENA, and a couple of other joint operations.

Internal Development (IDEV)

The internal development strategy is conducted to provide access to the population on peace, stability, and tranquility. The objective of internal development is to remove those conditions which give rise to discontentment and insurgency. IDEV includes those activities that are undertaken to acquire balanced social, political, and economic development through the implementation of internal development programs. IDEV programs during the emergency periods are aimed at the development of the environment around the population as part of nation-building, such as social development, political development, and economic development. For example, to strengthen social relations in a multiethnic society, the government proclaimed in Rukunegara which contains five principles instituted by royal proclamation on 31st August 1970, the aftermath of the racial riot incident on 13th May 1969. The incident proved at that time that Malaysian racial balance and stability were fragile and Rukunegara laid down the foundation of national unity in a multi-ethnic society (Wan Hashim, 1983; Kia Soong, 2007; Wan Norhasniah, 2010).

The commencement of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 gave a new dimension and orientation in which the three main ethnic communities in the country were the main beneficiaries. The NEP was implemented through the 5-year National Development Plan aimed at achieving three objectives; firstly, to eradicate poverty irrespective of race, secondly, to restructure the society so as reduce the economic imbalance between the Malays and non-Malays, and lastly strengthen national unity as a deterrence against communist aggression (Wan Hashim, 1983; Mahathir, 1999). In the words of Stepputat (2010) that development has several purposes in the context of counterinsurgency stabilization operations. It is intended to forge consent, create an incentive for the population to turn

against the insurgency, and reinforce the basis for a social contract between the government and the population in the contested areas.

The Hearts and Minds

The third significant thrust in KESBAN is winning the "hearts and minds" of the people. In traditional counterinsurgency operations, especially during the Malayan emergencies, the "hearts and minds"' factor was an important game changer in fighting insurgency. Although the factor had played a vital role along with the two important pillars of internal security and internal development in fighting and winning the support of the people, it was placed in silence mode within the KESBAN concept. However, in today's neo-classical counterinsurgency environment, the population factor or the "hearts and minds" is categorized as a contributing factor parallel with internal security and internal development. In short, the fundamental thrust of KESBAN inclusive of internal security, internal development, and "hearts and minds".

Placing emphasis on the people as an objective as expounded by Mao Tze-Tung is a unique characteristic of Communism. Winning over the people is the topmost priority in Communist Revolutionary Warfare concept (Nordin, 1981). According to Mao, it is the people who vote for the government, it is the people who form the government, it is the people who provide the economic livelihood and it is the people who the military and police draw their recruits (Nordin, 1981). This is the war associated with Mao Tze Tung's victory in China in 1949 and Ho Chi Minh's success in North Vietnam in 1954. Interpretation of Mao's people's war requires the mobilisation of the people and organising them in support of the revolutionary struggle through guerrilla warfare. One of the main reasons for the failure of the US in Vietnam was that the Americans ignored the people factor and strongly believe that the military factor will guarantee them success.

As portrayed in the KESBAN model in Diagram 1 below, the insurgent's aim is to contact and meet the people in the 'new villages' where they can obtain the commodity they are looking for, supply, information, sympathy, and new cadres. Once they manage to overcome all the government hurdles, obstacles, and developments along the process, the only element that will prevent the insurgent from getting the population support is the "hearts and minds" program organised and sown in the people. The population's refusal to support the insurgent's demands will be a priceless achievement in the government's "hearts and minds" program. The importance of the hearts and minds factor in fighting irregular warfare cannot be overemphasized. Since 1952, the Malayan government's policy was to put in place a major element of the "hearts and minds" approach against communist threats. The aim was to persuade the people of Malaya to abandon the MCP by threatening to punish those who aided the guerrillas and, at the same time holding out to those who supported the Government with the promise of greater security and

better social, economic, and political environment than the MCP could offer (Stubbs, 1989). Eventually, the British administration's inability to defeat a full-fledged and effective rural communist guerrilla army ensured that the fundamental idea of winning the "hearts and minds" became well-known as a strategy for countering rural guerrilla warfare (Stubbs, 1989). Therefore, in recognising "hearts and minds" as one of the fundamental thrusts of counterinsurgency apart from internal security and internal development would be a vital ingredient in any successful neo-classical counterinsurgency campaign.

Integral Elements of KESBAN

KESBAN is the sum total of all measures undertaken by government agencies to protect society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It is about all efforts taken in protecting the population which are coordinated at the highest level with the ultimate aim of denying the communist ideology and threats from being diffused among the population. In other words, KESBAN is the measured anticipatory response by the government to control the prevailing communist threats from escalating and jeopardise national security and prosperity (MAFJD 3-16). The principal achievement of the Malaysian security forces during the period of KESBAN operations was in ensuring the safe and successful implementation of the development program and vigilant of the social, economic, and political returns aftermath. The successful implementation of the KESBAN concept would amount to its adherence to the elements of KESBAN strategy.

KESBAN Strategy

According to Clausewitz, strategy is the necessary response to the inescapable reality of limited resources. No entity, regardless of size, has unlimited resources. Strategy, therefore, is about making choices on how we will concentrate our limited resources to achieve competitive advantage (Clausewitz, 1976). Liddell Hart on the other hand defined strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy". He continued that strategy is concerned not merely with the movement of forces – as its role is often defined – but with the effect (Hart, 1967). He was referring to a strategy that would be to produce a decision without any serious fighting. In short, strategy is something intangible, comparatively, tactics can be seen and tactile. KESBAN strategy can be observable as the trinity of interdependent components of balanced development, mobilisation, and neutralisation (MAFJD, 1988).

The first KESBAN strategy is balanced development, which is an important condition for the harmonious and smooth development of a country. It does not imply equal development of all regions of a country. Rather it indicates utilisation of the development potential of all areas as per its capacity so that the benefit of overall growth is shared by the inhabitants of all the different regions of a country. Thus, the regional balance implies a uniform distribution pattern of

the planned investment among different regions of a country. Alternatively, regional balance demands the distribution of investment in such a way so that the regional rates of growth in different parts of the country be equally attained, eliminating the regional disparities prevailing in the country (Kwatiah, 2015). During the Second Malayan Emergency, regional development in Malaysia was imbalanced. The four Northern states bordering Thailand were underdeveloped compared to other regions in Malaysia due to CPM threats and influences. It was known as the "Black Area" and the government then created the "KESBAN Belt", an imaginary area covering 358 square miles in an area of fifteen miles south of the Malaysia-Thailand border from the state of Perlis to Kelantan in which all socio-economic development projects fell under the responsibility of the National KESBAN Committee which in turn was directly managed by the NSC (NSC Instruction No. 11, 1980). It was the real achievement of the Malaysian government in the creation of the so-called "KESBAN Belt" that ultimately turned the once "black areas" dominated by the CPM into a thriving development zone, bringing the belt regions and all other regions to a balanced development.

Picture 1   KESBAN Belt Line

Source: Markas Tentera Darat, 1991

In any comprehensive development plan, for example, the Malaysian Five-Year Plan, it is deducible the special needs of the less developed areas such as within the "KESBAN Belt" area, were given due priority of development. The pattern of development in the "KESBAN Belt (Picture 1) areas as compared to other areas must be so devised as it brings balanced development.

The second KESBAN strategy is **mobilisation**. According to dictionary.com, mobilisation is the act of assembling and readying military troops and supplies for war, and it could also mean the action of organizing and encouraging a group of people to take collective action in pursuit of a particular objective. The word mobilization was first used in a military context in the 1850s describing the preparation of the Prussian Army. Mobilisation in war or national defence encompasses the organisation of the armed forces of a nation for active military service in times of war or other national emergencies. In its full scope, mobilisation includes the organisation of all resources of a nation for support of military efforts (Nicholson et.al., 2020). In so far as KESBAN is concerned, mobilisation includes all activities to motivate and organise the populace in support of the government through KESBAN programs as well as activities to protect the populace from insurgent actions. It is mobilising government assets to achieve balanced development and security. The definition of KESBAN is clear in that it constitutes the sum total of all measures taken by government agencies to strengthen and protect society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. This definition provides the efforts taken by mobilising all government assets against the enemy.

Diagram 1 below portrays the KESBAN model emphasizing the mobilization concept. The government implements the KESBAN concept by mobilizing all government assets, employing the Five M's management factors to deny communist influence at "new villages". These Five M's are money, manpower, material, machine, and method (Omoregie, 2015). All these factors were blended and added with psychological operations which include propaganda to win the "hearts and minds" of the people in supporting government efforts combating the insurgents. The diagram below shows right from the beginning at the border areas security operations were conducted to deny insurgents access to national borders, this was followed by internal security operations to prevent insurgent activities in the form of "OPS KOTA". Following that, all government agencies were involved in development projects to halt insurgents' efforts to come in contact with the population. The insurgents-population obstruction program came in the form of land development, infrastructure development, and economic development. Finally, the government employs the "hearts and minds" program to strengthen community resilience, directly denying insurgent ideology, and thus neutralise the organisation.

Diagram 1.   The KESBAN Model

Source Adapted from NSC Instruction No.11

The third strategy is neutralisation which is a state counterinsurgency effort to deny the insurgent organization to form a counter-state. The creation of a counter-state by the insurgent organization by mobilising human and material resources in order to form an alternative to the state. This alternative is called the counter-state. The counter-state may have much of the infrastructure possessed by the state itself, but this must normally be hidden since it is illegal. Thus, the counter-state is often referred to by the term "clandestine infrastructure". As the insurgents gain confidence and power, the clandestine infrastructure may become more open, as observed historically in communist regions during the Chinese Revolution, in South Vietnam after the North Vietnamese 1972 Easter Offensive, and in Colombia in the summer of 1998 (FM 3-07.22, 2004). A significant example of a counter-state was Sri Lanka where the Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE) had an advanced level of their insurgency by forming a counter-state that was able to challenge as well as provide a similar service provided by the Government of Sri Lanka to its citizen in other areas (Haelig, 2017).

The state has first to decide upon its goal, then, produce a plan to accomplish that end. All elements of national power are mobalised

and assigned their roles in carrying out the neutralization plan. The government establishes the legal framework and command and control (C2) mechanisms to enable the plan to be implemented. An effective C2 architecture involved the setting up of local coordinating bodies with representation from all key parties through the State Security Council Committee (SSCC), usually led by the Chief Minister or the District Security Council Committee (DSCC), headed by the District Officer (Clutterbuck, 1966). This local security body directs the counterinsurgency campaign in the area of operations concerned. The local security body normally includes appropriate representatives from the civil authority, the military, the police, the intelligence services, and the village head representing the civil population. The C2 allowed the security body to control civil or military assets sent into their area of operations (AO). The involvement of local officials and civilians can defeat the insurgents' attempt to undermine the political system (Hui Ling, 2015).

The State military and police forces must be the most visible force to the people. Security forces sent into an area to engage in counterinsurgency perform their responsibility at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Strategically, they serve as the shield for carrying out reform. It is imperative that security forces protect the populace and defend their own bases while simultaneously fighting an insurgency. Operationally, they systematically restore government control over the area, and tactically, security forces eliminate insurgent leadership, cadre, and combatants, through death and capture, by co-opting individual members, or by forcing insurgents to leave the area. This is analogous to separating the fish from the water. The local population (that also provide the insurgent mass base) is then secure and able to engage in normal activities. The forces also assist with civic action projects. These actions convey to the people a sense of progress and concern by the government to win their hearts and minds (Mao, 1961). The process of enemy attrition is conducted as a means to neutralise the insurgent's capability (see Diagram 3 above). The process takes place from beyond national borders in the form of joint security operations conducted by both countries' ground forces assisted by air support. This process of neutralization continues until the insurgent is in contact with the population or by then the insurgents were expected to be exhausted.

Thompson's Counterinsurgency Model

One of the earlier versions of the counterinsurgency theory in Malaya was popularised by Robert Thompson. Thompson is generally regarded as having been the world's leading expert on counterinsurgency. He studied the basic principles of communist insurgency and of counter-insurgency as they operate on the ground and affect the population of a threatened country. Thompson in his original inception suggested five basic principles which must be followed and within which all government measures must fall (Thompson, 1966). His principles were ingredients as a

counterinsurgency campaign against the CPM and articulating that the principles work as prevention is better than cure. His counterinsurgency model depicted in Diagram 4 below.


Diagram 2: Thompson Counterinsurgency Model

Source: Zakaria Yadi, Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey

The counterinsurgency model in Malaya as shown above is divided into two layered programs. In the first layer (shaded in blue), efforts are geared towards the formulation of a national strategic plan. Based on the overall concept, the second layer (shaded in green) will then surface. This is the stage where the government has to take anthropological factors into account because the execution of this layer deals directly with the population at large (Yadi, 2004). Thompson's first principle is that the government must have a clear political aim. It is to establish and maintain a free, independent, and united country that is politically and economically stable and viable. Thompson (1966) reiterated that the country should have a clear political aim to develop and unite against communist ideological influence, this will produce anti-communist sentiments among the population. The weaknesses in government administration should be reduced to the minimum or avoided such as corruption, which is a deceitful behaviour, that people in positions of power exhibit for personal gain and turning the state into a weak state, without efficient government machinery. Corruption was also the main contributing factor in the downfall of the Nationalist (Kuomintang) Party in China (Wu, 1969). An insurgent movement, according to Thompson, is a war for the people, and government measures must

be directed to promote and uphold law and order to protect the population and regain their confidence. So, without reasonably efficient government machinery, no programs or projects in the context of counterinsurgency will produce the desired results (Thompson, 1966).

The Second Principle is that the government must function in accordance with the law. There is an appeal or lure for the security forces to act not according to the law especially dealing with insurgency and terrorism. A clear example was the notorious "Batang Kali massacre", in which 24 unarmed villagers in the small town of Batang Kali, Selangor were executed by the British security patrol on December 12, 1948 (Hale, 2013). In short, a government that does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot expect the people to obey the law (Thompson, 1966). There were some tough laws enacted in Malaya during the emergency, like the deportation law which was later dropped due to its unfairness to the people. However, laws imposing curfews, the mandatory death penalty for possession of firearms, life imprisonment for collaborating with terrorists in providing supplies, and some other stringent laws were introduced and applied equally on the population. The population were aware about the laws and the government itself was functioning in accordance with the law. The government could be held responsible in the court of law for its actions if it failed to act in accordance with the law, and the population could be required to fulfil its own obligation to obey the law.

The Third Principle according to Thompson is the government must have an overall plan. The Government plan for countering the insurgency must be comprehensive that would include all aspects of the war efforts bearing on the insurgency. It should contain political, social, economic, administrative, police, security, and military matters pertaining to insurgency threats. There should be an equal or balance of military and civil activities, with proper coordination with all other areas as well. The British overall comprehensive plan is being commanded and controlled at the highest Federal level by the War Executive Council chaired by the High Commissioner and decentralized implementation by the state through the district level. The implementation actions are coordinated and attended by representatives from all government agencies to ensure commitment to the implementation of the plan. Frank Kitson, a British General who had served in Malaya, employed Thompson's principle in Northern Ireland by recognising the importance of both military and political measures and emphasised unified planning and coordination of military and civil authorities at all levels impacted on the overall plan against the Ireland Red Army (Kitson, 1971).

The Fourth Principle is that the government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the insurgent. This principle was applied during the initial stage of the insurgent movement.

However, once advocated, it should be maintained during the insurgency development stage. In order to effect the principle to succeed the strategy would be to disintegrate or eliminate the political organisation of the movement in urban and rural areas. The mean to apply this strategy is by reiterating the importance of the population as fuel for the insurgents as exemplified by Mao's famous metaphor as fish and water. In order to be victorious in the counterinsurgency campaign, by draining the water to catch the fish (Young & Leszczynsk, 2020). This has been clearly portrayed through the Briggs Plan during the Malayan Emergency period. The Briggs Plan and the promise of independence in 1952 made Malays oppose the Malayan Communist Party. After strong civic campaigns were implemented to win the Chinese population's hearts and minds, they joined the Malays, reducing the MCP's base support. (Paget; 1967). This has been a classical example of a successful strategy aimed at breaking the bond between the population and the insurgency through non-violent means.

The Fifth Principle is in the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, in which the government must secure its base areas. The government should work to limit the expansion of insurgence bases by securing its own base areas and working methodically outwards from them. The British created and established more than 400 "new villages" throughout Malaya under the Brigg's Plan, and these 'villages' were utilised as secured bases to launch security operations from these secured bases into the jungles and rural areas. They embarked on clear and hold operations from these secured bases. Clear and hold operation is a counter-insurgency strategy in which military personnel clear an area of guerrillas or other insurgents, and then keep the area clear of insurgents while winning the support of the populace for the government and its policies. These were applied by setting secure bases in the villages from where patrols were deployed into the jungles to progressively dominate the surroundings. (Paget; 1967). Deep penetration patrols in the jungles and a home guard composed mostly of individuals recruited locally were established to protect the new villages (Paget; 1967). During the Second Emergency, the Malaysian government created numerous KESBAN projects such as the construction of the East-West highway, the construction of a hydroelectric power plant, the conversion jungle areas into oil palm and rubber plantation, and others, in order to prevent insurgents from expanding their control areas. These were some of the efforts advocated by the Malaysian government in order to implement the strategy based on Thompson's counterinsurgency approach.

Galula's Counterinsurgency Theory

Galula begins his description of insurgency by introducing the basic characteristics of the revolutionary war in general because an insurgency (along with revolution and coup d'etat) is thought to be a type of revolutionary warfare. While a revolution is a sudden and "accidental" mass movement, a plot (or coup) is an intentional effort

to overthrow the top leadership in swift action. However, an insurgency is intentional as well, but it is not swift. It is a protracted struggle conducted methodically in order to attain intermediary goals with the eventual aim of overthrowing the existing power structure. Galula's literature is primarily concerned with insurgency, but it also refers to both revolutions and plots.

Galula introduced ten basic characteristics of the revolutionary war. The first is the asymmetry between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent; the common key characteristic of all three types of revolutionary warfare (revolution, plot, and insurgency) is their inherent asymmetry in nature. Counterinsurgents hold a virtual monopoly on tangible assets, such as material resources and legitimate power. Though the insurgents lack power, they have an advantage regarding intangible assets such as ideology and a general lack of responsibility. The counterinsurgents are powerful, but they are obliged to uphold law and order as Thompson principle number two, which limits their potential actions. Relatively, the insurgents are much freer to violate both their promises and social norms, as Galula (1964) set out as his basic principle. Number six: "fluidity of the insurgent, rigidity of the counterinsurgent". Insurgents are also capable of deciding when and where the conflict will begin since they become insurgents through their own contentious actions. Indeed, a counterinsurgency exists only in reaction to an insurgency. The asymmetric nature of this relationship requires the successful counterinsurgency to capitalize on its tangible advantages and limit the insurgent's ability to benefit from its intangible advantages. The distinct characteristic that marks the revolutionary war was different from the conventional war because of the initial asymmetry.

The second characteristic, or objective, is the population. The population is central to both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. Both parties will try to win over the population's support. The insurgents strive to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent and control it physically, in order to get the population's active support to win the war. This is because, in the end, the exercise of political power depends on the assumption or specific agreement of the population, or, at worst, on its submissiveness. An explicit example would be the Malayan insurgency, where the communist insurgents as well as the government adopted a population-centric approach to win over the people for their respective causes. The government uses propaganda through the "hearts and minds" program to convince the population to support in eliminating communist threats. Whereas the communists, through the party (CPM) mechanism, influenced the people's minds through the radio broadcast known as "Voice of Malayan Revolution (VMR)" in order to mobilise human and material support in establishing a communist regime in Malaya. Both targeted the people for their support and submissiveness.

The third characteristic is that the revolutionary war is a political war. Galula indicated that there is a vast difference between conventional and revolutionary wars. In the revolutionary war, since the objective was the population itself, the operations were designed to win it over for the insurgent or to keep it at least submissive for the counterinsurgent. These are deliberately of a political nature. As such, consequently, political action remains foremost throughout the conflict. Politics becomes an active instrument of operation. The interplay between political and military actions is so complicated that they cannot be easily separated, so every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa. According to Reis (2014), Galula holds the view that military action is secondary to political action. Similarly, Malaysia's experience in combating communist insurgency during the Second Emergency taught the supremacy of democratic civilian control of the operations, which advocates that the revolutionary war remains political throughout (Zulkifli, 2015).

Fourth, the gradual transition from peace to war. This fourth characteristic has an obvious difference between conventional war and, in this case, revolutionary war. In conventional war, the attacker confines his efforts within the national territory, channeling and launching his attack abruptly to obtain the initial shock effect. However, this is hardly possible in the revolutionary war because the insurgents lack sufficient strength at the outset, especially in the initial stage. Indeed, he may require years to build up significant political, let alone military, power. Therefore, there is usually little or no first shock, little or no surprise, and no possibility of an early decisive battle. In fact, the insurgent has no interest in producing a shock effect until he feels fully able to withstand the counterinsurgents' expected reaction. It is usual for the insurgents to adopt the "Fabian Strategy"[2] by avoiding a direct confrontation with the counterinsurgent force. In the words of Mao Tze-Tung, in his strategical and tactical gradual transition, especially on his principle of "unity of the opposites", Mao insists that "concealed within strength there is weakness, and within weakness, strength" (Mao Tze-Tung, 1961). It is the weakness of the guerrillas that they operate in small groups, but their small number allows them to move rapidly and secretly into the vulnerable enemy rear and avoid detection until they build strength to oppose the superior force, and it gradually transforms from peace to war.

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[2] The Fabian strategy is a military strategy where pitched battles and frontal assaults are avoided in favour of wearing down an opponent through a war of attrition and indirection. While avoiding decisive battles, the side employing this strategy harasses its enemy through skirmishes to cause attrition, disrupt supply and affect morale. Employment of this strategy implies that the side adopting this strategy believes time is on its side, but it may also be adopted when no feasible alternative strategy can be devised.

Fifth, a revolutionary war is a protracted war. Traditional conflict prescribes that wars should end as soon as possible because it saves resources, public support can be maintained more easily, and the devastation of war can be limited. In all of history, there is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged war (Clavell, 1983). In counterinsurgency, time is usually the ally of the weaker party. Galula (1964) reiterated that the protracted nature of a revolutionary war does not result from a design by either side; it is imposed on the insurgents by its initial weakness. A small group, insurgent in nature, needs time and resources to organise a revolutionary movement, to raise and develop into a standing armed force, to reach a balance with the opponent, and to overpower him. The Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was founded in 1930 but began the struggle for its cause in 1948 and was crushed in 1989. That was a solid 59 years of its existence, but their actual militant struggle lasted only 41 years. Similarly, Sri Lanka's Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE) was founded officially in 1976 and defeated in 2009, and that's a good 33 years of struggle by which the LTTE was able to reach a balance of power against its opponent (Haelig, 2017). A revolutionary war is short only if the counterinsurgent collapses at an early stage, as in Cuba, where the Batista regime disintegrated suddenly, less under the blows from the insurgents than through its own weakness; or if, somehow, a political settlement is reached, as in Tunisia, Morocco, and Cyprus (Paul et.al., 2013). To date, there has never been an early collapse of an insurgency.

The sixth characteristic is that insurgency is cheap and counterinsurgency is costly. This characteristic is a fact: promoting disorder is a legitimate objective for the insurgents because it assists the movement in disrupting the state's economy, yielding discontentment. This characteristic also accommodates undermining the strength and authority of the counterinsurgents (Galula, 1972). Galula explains that it is cheap to create disorder by the insurgents but very costly to prevent the disorder by the authorities. One should understand that successful insurgent movements employ distraction and deception in their struggle. John McCuen, a counterinsurgency expert, argues that for revolutionary war to succeed, Mao's advice is to wage a "strategically protracted war", in order to: firstly, wear down the enemy's strength through the cumulative effects of combat; second, get stronger by gaining the support of the people while establishing base areas and taking needed material from the enemy; and thirdly, obtain outside support in form of financial, political, and especially military (McCuen, 1966). If the insurgents are able to obtain all three, the counterinsurgency will be costlier and there is a great possibility for the insurgents to win.

The seventh characteristic of Galula's revolutionary war is the fluidity of the insurgent and the rigidity of the counterinsurgent. This seventh characteristic has a similar connotation to his fifth characteristic. The fact is that the insurgent by no means has significant assets or responsibilities; they are fluid. They remain in that capacity until such

time as they attain a balance of forces with the counterinsurgent. In 1951, the Greek Communists and the Viet Minh suffered a serious setback when they organized their forces into battalions, regiments, and divisions—when they transformed into a rigid organisation. Relatively, the counterinsurgent is rigid because they possess both assets and responsibility. In the revolutionary war, only the counterinsurgents were able to use substantial means since they possessed them. Over and above the entrenched fluidity and rigidity of the insurgents and the counterinsurgents, respectively, the nature of operations is further determined. Similar to the interpretation of Galula's fifth characteristic, it is simple for insurgents to promote disorder but complicated for counterinsurgents to prevent it. At the end of the day, both parties have to accept the conditions as they are and optimize the situation to their best advantage.

The eighth characteristic is the power of ideology. A cause is the most important criterion for the insurgents. It has to determine a cause that attracts supporters among the population. A cause is the insurgent's sole asset at its initial stage, and that will determine its sustainability in overcoming its weakness. Early in their development, insurgencies will strive to latch onto a cause or causes derived from political problems that are most relevant to the population. Causes may change as needed throughout a fight, but the very best are those that last, attract large numbers of people, and are easily identifiable with the insurgents. That being said, the power of ideology is always dependent on the support of the population because their attitude, especially in the middle of the struggle, is dictated by the level of protection and safety provided by either side and which one threatens the most and is likely to win. This is the criteria governing the population's attitude, and the new dynamic will remain until the end.

The ninth characteristic is propaganda, a one-sided weapon. The asymmetrical nature of a revolutionary war has a significant effect on propaganda. The insurgent, without any responsibility, is free to employ tricks, lies, cheats, or exaggerate issues, and he is not obliged to prove it. The insurgents were judged by his promises, not by his actions. So propaganda can be a powerful weapon for insurgents. On the other hand, the counterinsurgents are tied to their responsibility and past actions. For them, facts speak louder than words. For the counterinsurgents, propaganda is no more than a secondary weapon, used for informing and not fooling.

The last characteristic is that the revolutionary war remains unconventional until the end. Galula explained that a revolutionary will remain revolutionary until the end of the struggle. Although it has acquired strength and possesses significant regular forces to launch a conventional war against the opponent, insurgents will never revert to conventional forms. LTTE is a case, for example, in which it gained the required conventional strength by having its own army, navy, and air assets. Although the movement is capable of launching a

conventional war, it remains engaged with Sri Lankan forces in an insurgency setting. Moreover, insurgency has involved the population since the beginning of the conflict, it will continue to control and manipulate the population towards its end, refusing to battle the government force in direct confrontation, or what had been noted earlier as advocating the "Fabian Strategy[3]".

Kilcullen Counterinsurgency Theory

David Kilcullen described the three pillars of his counterinsurgency theory as a framework for interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency operations. His three pillars were security, political and economic, which support the overarching goal of control. It is an accepted fact that the one we are not in command; we do not control it (Kilcullen, 2006). Figure 3 below depicts the overall idea of Kilcullen's theory. It is, therefore, the unity of command (between agencies or among government and non-government actors) that means little in this environment. Instead, the basic requirement is to create unity of effort at all costs, and the collaboration or de-confliction between agencies is ought at least. This depends less on a shared command and control hierarchy, and more on a shared diagnosis of the problem, platforms for collaboration, information sharing, and de-confliction.

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[3] The Fabian strategy is a military strategy where pitched battles and frontal assaults are avoided in favour of wearing down an opponent through a war of attrition and indirection. While avoiding decisive battles, the side employing this strategy harasses its enemy through skirmishes to cause attrition, disrupt supply, and affect morale. Employment of this strategy implies that the side adopting it believes time is on its side, but it may also be adopted when no feasible alternative strategy can be devised.

Diagram 3.   Kilcullen Three Pillars Counterinsurgency Framework

Source: Adapted from David Kilcullen's Remarks During COIN Conference, 2006

Each agency as a single player must understand the others' strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, and objectives, and inter-agency teams must be structured for versatility (the ability to perform a wide variety of tasks) and agility (the ability to transition rapidly and smoothly between tasks). This shared diagnosis is based on information. Perception is crucial in developing control and influences over population groups. Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy. Every action in counterinsurgency sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to consolidate and unify this message. Importantly, the information campaign has to be conducted at a global, regional, and local level - because modern insurgents draw upon global networks of sympathy, support, funding, and recruitment (Kilcullen, 2006).

Kilcullen stressed that the three pillars are of equal importance, except if these pillars are not developed in parallel, the campaign becomes unbalanced: too much economic assistance with inadequate security would create an array of soft targets for the insurgents. Similarly, too much security assistance without political consensus or governance simply creates more capable armed groups. In developing each pillar, progress is measured by gauging effectiveness (capability and capacity) and legitimacy (the degree to which the population accepts that government actions are in its interest). The overall goal, according to this framework, is not to reduce violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but rather to return

the overall system to normality - noting that "normality" in one society may look different from normality in another. In each case, it seeks not only to establish control but also to consolidate that control and then transfer it to permanent, effective, and legitimate institutions.

This structured framework depicts information as its base because the information is the basis of all activities, and the three pillars Security, Political, and Economic which are anchored to the base firmly support hold the roof (Control). This approach builds on the "classical" counterinsurgency theory but also incorporates best practices that have emerged through experience in peacekeeping, development, fragile states, and complex emergencies in the past several decades. Describing each of the pillars, Kilcullen put in the following perspective.

Firstly, the security pillar. It comprises military security activities such as securing the population from attack or intimidation by guerrillas, bandits, terrorists or other armed groups and police security actions such as community policing, police intelligence or "Special Branch" activities, and paramilitary police field forces enterprises. It also incorporates human security, building a framework of human rights, civil institutions, individual protections, and public safety including fire, ambulance, sanitation, civil defence, and population security. This "pillar" engages military commanders' attention, but of course, military means are applied across the model, not just in the security domain, while civilian activity is critically important in the security pillar as well. Kilcullen asserted the importance of maintaining good rapport with the population. Brutality and violence against the local population were one of the reasons for the German defeat during World War II (Evans, 2008). Security is not the basis for economic and political progress, as argued by some military commanders and political leaders. Nor does security depend on political and economic progress as asserted by others. Rather, all three pillars must develop and progress in parallel and stay in balance, while being firmly based on an effective information campaign.

Secondly the political pillar on the parallel note, which focuses on mobilising support. As for the other pillars, legitimacy, and effectiveness are the principal dimensions in which it is developed. It comprises efforts to mobilise stakeholders in support of the government, marginalise insurgents and other groups, extend governance, and further the rule of law. A key element is the building of institutional capacity in all agencies of government and non-government civil institutions, and social re-integration efforts such as the disarming, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants (United Nations, 1999). Like the security pillar for military forces, the political pillar is the principal arena for diplomatic and civil governance assistance efforts although civil agencies play a significant role in the security and economic pillars as well.

Thirdly, the economic pillar which includes very closely the component of immediate assistance to humanitarian relief, and the assistance can only achieve through interagency cooperation. A single agency is incapable to provide the required assistance which includes a variety of different aid resources according to humanitarian needs. In a longer-term relief program, development assistance across a range of agricultural, industrial, and commercial activities would be provided to drive and enhance the economic development progress domestically and internationally. The economic pillar also emphasizes effective resource and infrastructure management in order to remove those conditions which breed insurgency. Infrastructure management assistance includes those activities that are undertaken to acquire balanced security and political progress through the implementation of internal development programs. The resource and infrastructure management assistance indicates utilisation of development potential of all areas as per its capacity so that the benefit of overall growth is shared by the inhabitants of all the different regions of a country. Overall, economic development is undertaken to renounce the recurrence of insurgency and disparities.

The Nexus Between Counterinsurgency Theories and KESBAN Concept

Thompson's Theory

Malaya is often seen by many writers in the later years as the exemplar of successful exercising counterinsurgency warfare. Its importance was that it was from this conflict that theorists like Thompson formulated his framework for the conduct of successful counterinsurgency operations. Thompson's theory was perceived as representing the British approach against insurgency during the first Malayan emergency period. Based on the five principles, which are offered as a guide to governments and allies on how they should face an insurgent threat. It was only after Thompson left public service with the British Advisory Mission in Vietnam that he began to write his experiences of the counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and Vietnam in the course in which he formulated his famous five principles of counterinsurgency.

In his manuscript, titled Defeating Communist Insurgency, Thompson lays out his strategy for defeating an insurgency based on the adoption of the five principles. According to him, the government having a clear political aim, creating and nurturing an independent, socially democratic, and united country with economic and political stability lays the foundation for maintaining the citizenry's Relatively, the KESBAN concept itself has the elements of security, development, and "hearts and minds" strategies to ensure that the nation is geared to become a genuinely independent and united country against communist ideological influences and militant activities. Abiding to the rule of law is acting outside of established law degrades the legitimacy of the government, Thompson conveys. Laws can be strict

and oppressive, such as curfews and pre-emptive detention, but if applied without bias among the entire population, are held as legitimate. The implementation of the KESBAN concept has been strengthened with Emergency Law 1948 to further limit the insurgency movement, for example, the national registration campaign on the issuance of identity cards, banishment law, and law on individual possession of firearms. All these laws were enforced without prejudice and well accepted by the population. Both the state and the people observed and comply to the same laws.

The principle on the creation of a comprehensive government plan for combating insurgency, not just a military solution but incorporating economic, social, and political plans as well. Balancing and harmonising between civil and military efforts provides enduring results in combating the insurgents as well as the causes of the insurgency itself. In the context of KESBAN, the government has identified the KESBAN Belt' area involving four northern states in Malaysia as development priority area concentrating on political stability, social development, security provision, 'hearts and minds', and other aspects of administrative arrangements for the benefit of the population. This linkage between Thompson's third principle and KESBAN's strategy justifies the affiliation between them. Thompson emphasises that the government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas, it is slightly more complex but closely related to the third principle focusing on subversion instead of guerrilla or terrorist activity. By combating the political and ideological wing of an insurgent movement, the insurgent's control of the population can be broken. Breaking the grasp isolates the militant insurgents from their required population-based support mechanisms such as supplies, intelligence, and recruits, thus centralising on the communist subversion activities rather than its guerrillas. KESBAN concept itself nurtures the development of the country while eliminating the communist subversive threats and laterally gaining the people's confidence and trust, thus alienating communist ideology and struggle.

Thompson's securing the base areas first acknowledge that it may cede rural areas to insurgent control but safeguarding the largest population centres and developed regions, provides the government a venue to demonstrate its authority and benefits. The government should try to limit the expansion of terrorist control areas by establishing government control areas in rural areas as well as in urban areas. In July 1948, after the declaration of Emergency 1948, the CPM launched an offensive by capturing the small town of Gua Musang after the police surrendered to a terrorist group that attacked with an estimated force of 500 comrades. CPM managed exert control Gua Musang town for five days and tried to expand its span of control by heading south towards Merapoh (Chin Peng, 2003). However, the British launched a counterattack and recaptured the town from the CPM. CPM has also tried to seize control Bukit Kepong in Johor by attacking the Police Station. The seizure of the Police

Station was aborted after assistance from the villagers arrived just as the Bukit Kepong Police Station was burned down to earth by the communists. Both of the incidents prove that the government had their base area to operate although ill-defended. From these bases, the government launched a counterattack or enable them to control the area. This relatively proves that the concept of KESBAN is aligned with Thompson's counterinsurgency theory. The continued establishment of "new villages" by the Malaysian authority during the Second Emergency was also partly to secured base area to expand its authority and extent of influence within the base area.

Galula's Theory

Galula's counterinsurgency strategy and tactics are rooted in several central insights, which he addresses it as laws. The nature of the revolutionary war is different from conventional war. Galula emphasises that both the counterinsurgent and the insurgent need the support of the population as the first law. Accordingly, the population becomes the objective of the counterinsurgent and the centre of gravity. The objective of the conflict is to secure the support of the population rather than control of the territory. Winning the support of the people is crucial for the results of the insurgency, the population is the key to the entire struggle. Comparatively, KESBAN's strategy as pointed out in the previous section made up of internal security, internal development, and winning the "hearts and minds".

Winning the "hearts and minds" interprets that the population must be won over to the counterinsurgent's side in order to succeed in the conflict (Galula, 1964). Population support during an insurgency is obtain through the active minority within the population and that nailed down Galula's second law. Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority. The goal in engaging the minority is not just to eliminate an insurgent force, but also to separate them from the population, especially by denying recruitment of new cadres and food distribution. Ideally, the isolation of the population is not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population. The purpose of continuing the implementation of the Brigg's Plan during the Second Malayan Emergency followed by the conduct of Operation Starvation through KESBAN has affected the isolation of the population from the insurgents (Weichong, 2014). Nevertheless, Galula argued that the support from the population is always conditional, connoting that the minority hostile to the insurgent will not prevail as long as the threat of consequence has not been lifted to a reasonable extent.

The support of the population would be lost if the population is not efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the adversary. Moreover, the population must believe that the counterinsurgent has the will, the means, and the ability to win against the struggle. It is no little thing to throw in one's lot with

the counterinsurgent, and the population must believe it will be safe for now and in the future. Finally, Galula stressed that intensive efforts and vast means are essential to succeed in counterinsurgency conflict. Concentrated efforts prohibit "diluted" efforts all over the country and are required in each successive area. Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining the support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to seize an adjacent area. On the lateral basis, KESBAN projects undertaken by the government such as the construction of the East-West highway, construction of hydroelectric power dams as in Temenggor, Kenyir, Muda, and the development of FELDA, FELCRA, and RISDA schemes were some of the government effort to bring development within the KESBAN Belt areas in order to uplift the socio-economy of the population, who were long deprived of the development mainstream within the country. These are again efforts by the government to build confidence among the population and as part of the winning the "hearts and minds" program.

Kilcullen's Theory

Kilcullen underlined three pillars of his counterinsurgency theory holding the overarching goal of control is actually the unity of command (between agencies or among government and non-government actors) that means little in this environment. In reality, the elements within the three pillars that elaborate in the pillars of politics, security, and economy indeed comprehend in Kilcullen's theory prevail in the concept of KESBAN. KESBAN also emphasised political stability, economic well-being, and security sustainability. The definition of KESBAN itself clearly reiterates the cooperation and collaboration among government agencies in creating a harmonised security environment so that development efforts can be carried out without hindrance. Kilcullen also underscored the importance of cooperation between government agencies through his three pillars of counterinsurgency theory (Kilcullen, 2006).

Kilcullen's theory is not primarily military, but it integrates military means with political and social actions under the strong control of a single authority. Kilcullen considers the three pillars to be of equal importance because unless they are developed in parallel, the campaign becomes unbalanced. Comparatively, KESBAN's strategy of balanced development is an important pre-condition for the stability and smooth development of a country. Extreme poverty among the population in Malaysia during the 1940s through 1960s was the main basis that bred communism. Poverty eradication and economic restructuring were the dual thrusts of the new economic policy (NEP) launched in 1971. The introduction of the KESBAN concept as a mechanism in fighting insurgency also took into account the poverty eradication through economic activities which was an element in the

668

KESBAN strategy as well as one of the pillars of Kilcullen's counterinsurgency theory.

Acknowledgements

Conclusion

Security and development (KESBAN) was a classical counterinsurgency concept advocated against the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) with regards to the threats to Malaysian national security. It was a brain wave concept battling communist terrorists in which the security forces were designed to build a secure environment to allow national development activities to take place without hindrance. The crucial element of KESBAN is to restrain insurgency from advancing becoming an impendence to the nation by nailing down government presence in the rural and aboriginal concentrated areas. KESBAN ingredients consist of internal security (IS), internal development (IDEV), and hearts and minds (HM). The three ingredients were blended transforming into a substance that was able to resist insurgency and ensure national development with the population patronage.

In blending the activities in KESBAN, the Malaysian government was inspired by the British countermeasures during the First Emergency (1948-1960). British countermeasures include civil and military corrective measures, and psychological operations conducted against the CPM. The British famous "Brigg's Plan" and the approach the British took in protecting the interest of the "Orang Asli" have been the underlying emphasis of the KESBAN concept apart from military-centric countermeasures in the form of domestic and joint security operations. The theoretical concept of KESBAN was then implemented through practical means by synthesising the security aspects with the development aspects in the form of the construction of the East-West Highway, hydro-electric dams, FELDA and RISDA development schemes that have benefitted the nation as well as the population by eradicating poverty and graving communist ideology.

KESBAN in its theoretical concept has similarities with counterinsurgency theories instituted by three known scholars; Robert Thompson known for his five-principal counterinsurgency model, David Galula patented his four laws of counterinsurgency, and David Kilcullen acknowledged for his three-pillar counterinsurgency theory. These counterinsurgency theories and KESBAN as a counterinsurgency concept has a close affiliation. Therefore, KESBAN is also contemplated as a counterinsurgency theory as good as the

three counterinsurgency theories by the famous gurus. Unexpectedly, all three counterinsurgency theories and the KESBAN concept have a similar approach in combating insurgency by blending the population-centric (stressing on hearts and minds) and the enemy-centric (emphasising military resolution). In the final analysis, KESBAN as a concept worth to be implemented as a counterinsurgency framework in defeating an insurgency of any nature.

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